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Abstract 
 
Despite the expanding scope of arbitrability in recent times, the arbitrability of tax 
disputes remains an unsettled issue. While it has been a hotly discussed topic in the field 
of international investment arbitration, it also warrants attention in the context of 
international commercial arbitration. In particular, the arbitrability of investor-state 
taxation disputes in this area raises a number of challenging issues. Accordingly, this 
article provides an in depth examination of the arbitrability of investor-state taxation 
disputes in international commercial arbitration. It concludes that traditional concerns 
regarding the arbitrability of tax disputes do not, in principle, support the inarbitrability 
of all tax disputes. Rather, there is a logical distinction to be drawn between taxation 
disputes that directly implicate the sovereignty of states, and disputes as to taxation that 
are merely contractual in nature, and only involve taxation indirectly. In reaching this 
conclusion, this article also yields some insights into both the question of which law 
should govern arbitrability and also into the nature of arbitrability more generally, in 
the light of the developments that have occurred in this area.   
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I Introduction  
 
It is now reasonably clear as far as the literature is concerned that investor-state tax 
disputes may be arbitrable in the context of investment treaty arbitration. Much 
academic discussion has focussed on this issue.1 However, the position remains murky 
in the field of international commercial arbitration. This is a context in which there has 
not been much discussion of the arbitrability of tax disputes, despite it being one in 
which the issue commonly arises. This article therefore sets out to offer a comprehensive 
analysis of the arbitrability of investor-state taxation disputes in the field of international 
commercial arbitration. This involves examining disputes where states and investors 
operate on the same plane, as contracting parties. Particularly due to this horizontal 
playing field, challenging questions arise, primarily concerning state sovereignty.   
 
A principled resolution will be offered to this problem. This article will argue that 
there is a logical distinction to be drawn between taxation disputes that directly 
implicate the sovereignty of states, and disputes as to taxation that are merely 
contractual in nature, and only involve taxation indirectly. In doing so, it will begin by 
examining arbitrability and the issues associated with what law should govern the 
question of arbitrability. However, this article will not offer any final pronouncements 
on which law should govern. Rather, it will proceed to contextualise the situations in 
which tax disputes arise, with a particular focus on the kinds of contractual clauses in 
investor-state contracts, and examine the traditional objections to the arbitrability of 
such disputes. It will then consider the extent to which the traditional objections to the 
arbitrability of tax disputes succeed, the existing case law, and general trends towards 
arbitrability. It will conclude that the distinction suggested can be generally supported 
and that only those disputes involving taxation indirectly should be arbitrable. In doing 
so it will discern some broader insights into arbitrability.  
                                                
1  See for example William W Park "Arbitrability and Tax" in Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L 
Brekoulakis (eds) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2009); William Park Arbitration of International Business Disputes: 
Studies in Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006); Thomas Walde and Abba 
Kolo "Investor-State Disputes: The Interface Between Treaty-Based International Investment 
Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty" (2007) 35 Intertax 424; and Natalia Quinones Cruz in her article 
"International Tax Arbitration and the Sovereignty Objection: The South American Perspective" 
(2008) 51 Tax Notes International 533. 
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II Arbitrability 
A A Definition 
 
The question of arbitrability places limits on the legal issues that may be adjudicated by 
an arbitral tribunal.2 According to Redfern and Hunter "[a]rbitrability … involves 
determining which types of dispute may be resolved by arbitration and which belong 
exclusively to the domain of the courts".3 In other words arbitrability draws the line 
between freedom of contract and the role of the courts as protectors of the public 
interest.4 Thus, traditionally arbitrability is concerned with particular subject-matters that 
cannot be decided by arbitration, "even if the parties have otherwise validly agreed to 
arbitrate such matters".5 This doctrine developed on the basis that:6 
 
some matters so pervasively involve public rights, or interests of third parties, 
which are the subjects of uniquely governmental authority, that agreements to 
resolve such disputes by 'private' arbitration should not be given effect.  
 
Determining which subject-matters are incapable of being arbitrated on this basis is 
the "classic function of arbitrability".7 This function is known as objective arbitrability, 
substantive arbitrability, arbitrability rationae materiae or more generally as the non-
arbitrability doctrine.8 It is important to distinguish this notion of arbitrability from 
subjective, or contractual, arbitrability.9 Subjective arbitrability is concerned with 
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, according to the principles of contract 
law.10 Unlike subjective arbitrability, objective arbitrability raises questions of 
"fundamental policy".11 These questions also influence the validity of the arbitration 
                                                
2  Nigel Blackaby and others Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009) at 123.  
3  Blackaby, above n 2, at 123.  
4  Thomas E Carbonneau with Francois Janson "Cartesian Logic and Frontier Politics: French and 
American Concepts of Arbitrability" (1994) 2 Tul J Intl & Comp L 193 at 194.  
5  Gary B Born International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, Austin, 2009) at 
767. See also Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 195 and 210; and Janet Walker "Arbitrability: 
Are there Limits" (paper presented at the LCIA Symposium, Montreal, October 2004), at 2.  
6  Born, above n 5, at 768; Blackaby, above n 2, at 123; and David AR Williams and others Williams & 
Kawharu on arbitration (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2011) at [7.3.1]. 
7  Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 195.  
8  Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 195, 196 and 210. See also Born, above n 5, at 767 and 
Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds) Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) at 313.   
9  Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 195, 196 and 210. This is also known as "arbitrability rationae 
personae". See also Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at 313. 
10  Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 195, 196 and 210.  
11  Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 195.  
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agreement, but in a broader sense than subjective arbitrability. Consequently, objective 
arbitrability is a condition placed on the validity of both the agreement to arbitrate, and 
the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 
B Determining Arbitrability 
 
The question of arbitrability is not easily determined in the abstract. One must first 
determine the law governing arbitrability, thereby implicating an array of choice of law 
issues. At the most basic level this issue arises because the question of arbitrability "is 
governed by national law" and in the international context "there may be more than one 
national law that connects with the arbitration".12 Further, these national laws, while 
raising a "common set of concerns", "differ from nation to nation".13 Thus, the answer to 
whether a dispute is arbitrable may change depending on which law applies to determine 
arbitrability.14  
 
However, the question of the law governing arbitrability is more complicated than 
this basic description suggests. This is because a determination of arbitrability is not 
only relevant at the beginning of the arbitral proceedings. In fact, there are several stages 
in the process, and also several different fora, where it may be invoked.15 These include 
(a) before the tribunal at the beginning of the proceedings; (b) before state courts, either 
as a matter to be determined before the arbitration can go ahead, or as a question of 
whether the award should be set aside; and (c) before the court of enforcement.16 As a 
result there are many options when considering the law that may apply to determining 
questions of arbitrability. Gary Born lists these as:17  
 
(a) the law of the nation in which enforcement of an award is being or will 
eventually be sought; (b) the law governing the parties' arbitration agreement; (c) 
the law of the seat of the arbitration; (d) the law of the judicial forum where an 
arbitration agreement is sought to be enforced; (e) the law that provides the basis 
for the relevant substantive claim that is said to be non-arbitrable; or (f) a uniform 
international definition of non-arbitrability derived from the New York Convention 
(or other relevant conventions).  
 
                                                
12  Okezie Chukwumerije Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books, 
London, 1994) at 53.  
13  Born, above n 5, at 767-768 and 775. See also Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.27].  
14  See for example, Blackaby, above n 2, at [3.44]. 
15  Born, above n 5, at 516. 
16  Bernard Hanotiau "What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability?" (1996) 12 Arb Intl 391 at 391. 
See also Born, above n 5, at 516.  
17  Born, above n 5, at 517.  
THE ARBITRABILITY OF INVESTOR-STATE TAXATION DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 
9 
Thus, as Bernard Hanotiau notes, the choice regarding which law governs 
arbitrability is challenging and "may depend upon the stage at which [arbitrability] is 
raised".18 Putting aside the issue of enforcement, where it is clear that the law governing 
arbitrability is the law of the forum where enforcement is sought,19 there is no consensus 
about how the choice as to which law governs should be made.20 In saying this, a review 
of the literature makes it clear that there are two prime contenders for the law governing 
arbitrability, at least when it is being decided by an arbitral tribunal. These are the law 
governing the arbitration agreement and the lex arbitri.21 It is appropriate to examine the 
merits of each approach, with specific focus on investor-state tax disputes.  
1 Law governing the arbitration agreement 
 
The law governing the arbitration agreement is the "law expressly or impliedly chosen 
by the parties" or "in the absence of such choice, the law which is most closely 
connected with the arbitration agreement, which will in general be the law of the seat of 
the arbitration".22 Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws suggests that in 
most cases the parties' express or implied choice can be discerned.23 In discerning such a 
                                                
18  Hanotiau, above n 16, at 393.  
19  The United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959), art 
V(2)(b). See also Albert Jan van den Berg The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Netherlands, 1981) at 369; 
Born, above n 5, at 517; Stavros L Brekoulakis "Law Applicable to Arbitrability: Revisiting the 
Revisited Lex Fori" in L Mistelis and S Brekoulakis (eds) Arbitrability: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2009) at [6-3]; and Jean-
Francois Poudret and Sebastien Besson Comparative Law of International Arbitration (2nd ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) at [331]. 
20  Born, above n 5, at 516 and 517. For suggestions as to how to approach this issue see Antoine Kirry 
"Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe" (1996) 12 Arb Intl 373; Hanotiau, above n 16; 
Brekoulakis, above n 19, at ch 6; and Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.115] and [10.42]. 
21  Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [332]. See also Born, above n 5, at 521-530 (referring to the 
rules of the seat, the law governing the agreement, and an international approach); W Laurence 
Craig, William W Park, and Jan Paulsson International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd ed, 
Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry NY, 2000) at 61 (referring to the law that governs the agreement); 
Hanotiau, above n 16, at 392 (referring to the law governing the arbitration agreement and the law of 
the seat of the arbitration); and Loukas A Mistelis "Arbitrability – International and Comparative 
Perspectives: Is Arbitrability a National or an International Law Issue" in Loukas A Mistelis and 
Stavros L Brekoulakis (eds) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2009) at [1.34] and [1.35] (referring to the lex arbitri and 
international public policy).  
22  Lawrence Collins and others (eds) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15ed, Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, 2012) at 829, [16-016] and [16-019] [Dicey]. See also Sulamerica v Enesa 
Engenharia [2012] EWCA Civ 638. 
23  Dicey, above n 22, at [16-016]. 
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choice, "in many cases, the law applicable to the main contract will" be influential.24 
This is particularly important in the context of investor-state contracts, where the law 
governing the main contract is often the law of the host-state.25 For the purposes of 
analysing the merits of using the law governing the arbitration agreement to determine 
arbitrability, it will be assumed that the law governing the agreement will be the law of 
the host-state. 
 
The general argument here is that it should be a function of the law governing the 
agreement to determine the outer bounds of what the parties can or cannot agree to 
arbitrate. The theory offered by the literature for this approach to determining 
arbitrability lies in the autonomy of the parties.26 The idea here is that the choice of the 
parties as to what law applies to their agreement to arbitrate should be respected in 
determining arbitrability.27 It is also said that this view accords with the need for 
contractual security.28 
 
This approach may be viewed as meritorious insofar as it seeks to apply a law that 
is more likely to be causally connected to the dispute. Okezie Chukwumerije, advocating 
for governing law to be determined on the basis of "the jurisdiction whose policy 
interests are most directly implicated by the parties' transaction",29 notes that the "law 
applicable to the arbitration agreement would be a relevant standard in determining 
arbitrability in cases where it is the law of the country that is most closely connected to 
the underlying transaction".30 Given the law governing the arbitration agreement is likely 
to be the law of the host-state, this criterion would be met. Prima facie, this appears to be 
a strong reason for determining arbitrability on the basis of the law governing the 
arbitration agreement, at least in the context of investor-state contractual disputes. 
However, several fundamental issues arise.  
 
                                                
24  However this will not always be the case: Dicey, above n 22, at [16-012]. 
25  See for example Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Liberia, China-Union (Hong Kong) Mining Co Ltd and China-Union Investment (Liberia) Bong 
Mines Co Ltd (19 January 2009) sourced from Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(LEITI) <http://www.leiti.org.lr/>, s 29 (providing for the applicability of Liberian law); and the 
Concession Agreement for Gola Forest East and Gola Forest West, Forest Reserves (Ratification) 
Act 1977 in Peter Fischer (ed) A Collection of International Concessions and Related Instruments: 
Contemporary Series (Volume 1, Oceanea Publications, United States of America, 1981), art 9.2.2 
(In this agreement the arbitration clause itself specified the law governing the agreement to be the 
law of Sierra Leone, the host-state.)  
26  Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [332].  
27  Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [332]; and Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 54. 
28  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 54. This position is endorsed by Hanotiau, above n 16, at 393-395.  
29  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 55. 
30  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 54.  
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A general issue may arise where the law of the seat concerning the arbitrability of 
the dispute is different from the law governing the agreement.31 Difficulties arising in 
this regard have been put forward as a reason for using the lex arbitri over the law 
governing the arbitration agreement.32 For example, the jurisdiction where the arbitral 
tribunal is seated may consider the issue inarbitrable, contrary to the law governing the 
agreement. This leads one to question whether the tribunal can ignore the law of the 
seat, in the light of its duty to the parties to "render an enforceable award".33 Such an 
outcome does not seem desirable given arbitrability is essentially an "escape device" for 
a state such as the seat, and the tribunal draws on the laws of the seat for support in 
conducting the arbitration.34  
 
Conversely, the law of the seat may consider an issue is arbitrable, where the law 
governing the agreement considers otherwise.35 Mihail Danov notes that in this scenario 
the arbitration should go ahead in the seat. However:36 
  
the arbitration agreement would become unenforceable in any country where the 
arbitrability had been determined by the law governing the arbitration agreement. 
This result would be unfortunate since concurrent ordinary court proceedings would 
not be stayed in those countries.  
 
Danov concludes that the use of the law governing the arbitration agreement "would 
lead to an appropriate result only if it [coincided] with the law of the seat".37 
 
Further, more fundamental issues arise in the investor-state context. The 
overarching issue is that choosing the law governing the arbitration agreement 
essentially reduces the question of arbitrability to one of the consent of the parties. This 
is as a result of the law governing the agreement most likely being the law of the host-
state. It is suggested that this appears to take the autonomy justification for using the law 
governing the arbitration agreement to an extreme. It is one thing to respect parties' 
choices as to the applicable law, and quite another for that choice to be allowed to 
undermine the basis of the doctrine of arbitrability.  
 
For example, imagine a state had agreed to make tax issues arbitrable in an 
investment contract, but the law of that state, which governed the arbitration agreement, 
                                                
31  Blackaby, above n 2, at [3.43].  
32  Mihail Danov "The law governing arbitrability under the Arbitration Act 1996" [2008] LMCLQ 536 
at 539. 
33  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 55. 
34  Born, above n 5, at 525; and Dicey, above n 22, at [16-029]. 
35  Danov, above n 32, at 539.  
36  Danov, above n 32, at 539.  
37  Danov, above n 32, at 539.  
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stated that tax issues were inarbitrable.38 In this context, the use of the law governing the 
agreement to determine arbitrability is not workable. The state will likely be precluded 
from relying on its own law to avoid the arbitrability of the dispute, thereby reducing the 
issue to one of consent.39 In other words, if the parties consent to arbitrating the dispute, 
it will be arbitrable. This conflates the questions of arbitrability and jurisdiction and as 
such, is not very analytically satisfying. A decision as to whether something is arbitrable 
should not hinge on the parties consent, given the whole point of the doctrine is to 
consider whether some matters are not suitable for resolution by arbitration, despite the 
parties having agreed to arbitrate them.  
 
A similar argument is advanced more generally by Poudret and Besson. In their 
view the reasons put forward concerning party autonomy for the use of the law 
governing the arbitration agreement to determine arbitrability are unpersuasive. This is 
because:40 
 
arbitrability constitutes a legal restriction on the autonomy of the parties. Such 
autonomy only exists within the limits of the mandatory rules of the law of the seat 
governing the arbitration, which the arbitral tribunal must respect. Therefore, the 
parties cannot deviate from the criteria of arbitrability established by such law, even 
if they submit their arbitration agreement to the law of another country. Otherwise, 
it would be too easy to evade the mandatory character of the restrictions to the 
arbitrability of certain disputes. 
 
These considerations demonstrate that the law governing the arbitration agreement 
is an unusual starting point for determining arbitrability in the investor-state context, 
despite probably being most closely connected with the dispute, in the sense that one of 
the parties has complete control over the law. Perhaps it could be acceptable if 
arbitrability were only concerned with the public interest of the state involved in the 
transaction. However, where tax disputes are involved, wider public policy 
considerations involving the international system of states come into play.41  
                                                
38  For example, Cruz, above n 1, notes that many South American countries run into problems when 
agreeing to arbitrate tax disputes, because this is prohibited by their constitutions or domestic law. 
39  This would likely be an application or variation of the "rule that states … cannot rely on restrictive 
provisions of their own law to challenge the validity of arbitration agreement into which they 
unreservedly entered". Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, note (at [547]) that this rule is "now firmly 
established". 
40  Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [332]. (Emphasis added).  
41  See section V(B)(1)(c) below at 31.  
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2 Lex arbitri  
 
The lex arbitri is the law of the seat of the arbitration.42 It is the "procedural law of an 
arbitration",43 dealing with both the "internal procedure of the arbitration itself", for 
example "commencement of the arbitration, appointment of arbitrators, pleadings, 
provisional measures, evidence, hearings and awards" and the "external intervention of 
national courts in the arbitral process".44  
 
The general argument here is that "since the arbitration is to proceed in the arbitral 
seat, the law of that jurisdiction", being responsible for governing procedural matters, 
"should determine the threshold question whether the dispute is subject to arbitration".45 
In this vein, it has been suggested that arbitrability is a procedural issue "to do with the 
compulsory jurisdiction of courts (or of other public authorities)".46 As arbitrability is a 
preliminary matter to be decided before the hearing of the substantive dispute, it seems 
natural that the law that governs the procedure of the arbitration should also apply to the 
question of arbitrability. In this respect it is worth distinguishing arbitrability from issues 
pertaining to the arbitration agreement clearly governed by the law governing the 
arbitration agreement, such as "the interpretation, effect and scope".47 Arbitrability is a 
separate legal question, only relating to the arbitration agreement indirectly in the sense 
that, once arbitrability is determined, it may impact the arrangement between the parties. 
Indeed, Redfern and Hunter lists arbitrability as one of the "matters with which the lex 
arbitri might be expected to deal".48  
 
The inherent problem with the view that the lex arbitri should govern the question 
of arbitrability is that it is unlikely to have a "close connection with the underlying 
commercial agreement".49 Where the parties have specified a seat, it is likely that choice 
was informed by factors such as convenience, or the availability of a neutral forum, as 
opposed to being informed by the law of the particular forum chosen.50 Further, if the 
                                                
42  Dicey, above n 22, at 829 and [16-035]. 
43  Dicey, above n 22, at [16-029]. 
44  Dicey, above n 22, at [16-029]. While the lex arbitri may be the same as the law governing the 
arbitration agreement where the parties' choice regarding the law of the arbitration agreement cannot 
be discerned, this article will assume that this is not the case. 
45  Born, above n 5, at 521. Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [332]-[336] support the view that the lex 
arbitri is the correct law to use in determining arbitrability, both for the arbitral tribunal and the 
courts. 
46  Danov, above n 32, at 538.  
47  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 34. 
48  Blackaby, above n 2, at [3.43]. 
49  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 55. 
50  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 59; Dicey, above n 22, at [16.009]; and Campbell McLachlan Lis 
Pendens in International Litigation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Lieden/Boston, 2009) at 189-190.  
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parties have not specified a seat, the seat may not be chosen by the parties themselves.51 
Therefore it is not necessarily the case that the law of the seat has any "connection with 
the subject-matter of the dispute or the parties".52  
 
On the contrary, it has been suggested that by "choosing a country in which to 
arbitrate, the parties create a close connection between the arbitration and that 
country".53 Mihail Danov argues that such a choice indicates the parties have 
"implicitly" "chosen the laws of that place to govern the arbitrability".54 Viewing 
arbitrability as a procedural matter, it should be "governed by the law of the country in 
which the arbitration is held, on the ground that it is the country most closely connected 
with the proceedings",55 it being "well established that, when contracting to arbitrate in a 
particular place, parties have consented to having procedural matters governed by the 
law of that place".56 On this view then, there is a sufficient connection between the law 
of the seat and the dispute.  
 
Further, the context of tax disputes demonstrates that seeking to find which 
jurisdiction's "policy interests are most directly implicated" is not the most appropriate 
criterion. This criterion would suggest that the law of the host-state should govern 
arbitrability. However, there are broader policy considerations than just those of the 
host-state, which need to be considered. This will be elaborated on in depth below,57 but 
for now it is sufficient to say that these considerations suggest that the law of the seat 
could have valid reasons for denying arbitrability, despite not having any particular 
connection with the underlying dispute at all. Thus, it appears to be more appropriate for 
the lex arbitri to govern arbitrability.58  
 
                                                
51  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 59. 
52  Dicey, above n 22, at [16.009].  
53  Danov, above n 32, at 540.  
54  Danov, above n 32, at 540.  
55  James Miller v Whitworth Street Estates [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep 269; [1970] AC 583 (HL) at 607, 609, 
612 and 615. See also Danov, above n 32, at 541.  
56  Danov, above n 32, at 541. 
57  See section V(B)(1)(c) below at 31.  
58  Chukwumerije, above n 12, at 59 suggests there may also be forum-shopping considerations. 
However, forum-shopping issues may arise regardless of what law is governing the issue of 
arbitrability, and this article will not deal further with this consideration.  
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3 International public policy 
 
In addition, there is the potential to use rules of international public policy to determine 
arbitrability.
59
 The term international public policy may be used to refer to several 
interrelated concepts.60 This article will refer to it in the sense of transnational public 
policy, as opposed to national rules on international public policy.61 Transnational public 
policy "can be defined as the set of legal principles, not belonging to the law of a 
particular State".62 It is reliant on consensus between states.63 International public policy 
in this sense presents a genuine third choice to the options discussed above, at least with 
respect to arbitral tribunals, who are "not the organs of a particular legal order".64  
 
The starting point for determining arbitrability under this approach would be that a 
dispute is arbitrable unless there is a rule of transnational public policy against it. In the 
context of tax disputes Emmanuel Gaillard has suggested that there is "no rule of 
international public policy opposing the arbitrability of tax disputes per se".
65
 However, 
this appears to pose the issue too broadly. This is because there exists the potential for 
significant international consequences, if the arbitrability of some kinds of disputes 
involving taxation is allowed.66 Again, these issues will be discussed in depth. All that 
need be noted now is that there may be a more nuanced approach, whereby there is a 
rule of transnational public policy that some kinds of taxation disputes are not arbitrable, 
and that such a rule find its basis in concerns relating to sovereignty and general practice 
indicating the consent of states to such a principle.  
 
                                                
59  Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at [559] and [541]; Born, above n 5, at 530; Mistelis, above n 21, at 
[1.35]; L Yves Fortier "Arbitrability of Disputes" in Gerald Aksen and others (eds) Global 
Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution (ICC Publishing, Paris, 2005) 
at 274; Karim Yousef "The Death of Inarbitrability" in Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis 
(eds) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2009) at [3-53]; and Craig, Park and Paulsson, above n 21, at [5-07].  
60  Mark A Buchanan "Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration" (1988) 26 Am Bus LJ 
511 at 514.  
61  See International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration "Final 
Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards" (International 
Law Association New Delhi Conference, 2002) at [11]; and Pierre Mayer "Effect of International 
Public Policy in International Arbitration?" in Loukas A Mistelis and Julian DM Lew (eds) 
Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2006) 
at [2-2].  
62  Mayer, above n 61, at [2-8].  
63  International Law Association, above n 61, at [11]; and Mayer, above n 61, at [2-9]. 
64  Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at [559].  
65  Emmanuel Gaillard "Tax Disputes Between States and Foreign Investors" (1997) 217 NYLJ 25.  
66  See section V(B)(1)(c) below at 31. 
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In considering transnational public policy as a contender for the law governing 
arbitrability it is important to recognise that this is not its most conventional use. This is 
because typically the function of public policy is eliminating "agreements, rules or 
decisions that would contravene certain fundamental values or interests".67 This may be 
either during the substantive determination or when enforcement is sought.68 Conversely, 
the use of public policy in determining arbitrability occurs ab initio and does not involve 
disapplying other rules or decisions, per se.69  
 
However, it has been recognised that it is appropriate to refer to public policy in the 
context of determining arbitrability.70 In many ways, moving to a transnational public 
policy approach to arbitrability seems like the natural progression from the expansion of 
arbitrability that has occurred on the basis of national rules on international public 
policy.71 The approach to international arbitration has been increasingly broadened with 
reference to international commerce, compared to tighter restrictions that may exist on 
the basis of public policy domestically.72 Because of this it may be more appropriate to 
take a "genuinely international" approach to determining arbitrability.73  
 
Further, a move to focusing on transnational public policy is particularly apt given 
it would remove arbitrability from the domain of national law and remove associated 
choice of law issues. While the use of public policy in this context is not its most 
conventional use, it should perhaps be less controversial, in that it is being applied to a 
question over which, by definition, the parties should have no control. The fact that 
transnational public policy is not tied in with the law that the parties have selected, 
                                                
67  Mayer, above n 61, at [2-12]. See also Javier Garcia de Enterria "The Role of Public Policy in 
International Commercial Arbitration" (1989-1990) 21 Law & Poly Int Bus 389 at 392.  
68  Garcia de Enterria, above n 67, at 393.  
69  Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel "Public Policy and Arbitrability" in Pieter Sanders (ed) Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (ICCA Congress Series No 3, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, New York, 1986) at 178. 
70  Fifi Junita "Public Policy Exception in International Commercial Arbitration – Promoting Uniform 
Model Norms" (2012) 5 Contemp Asia Arb J 45 at 56-57; Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel "Public Policy as 
a Limit to Arbitration and Enforcement" (paper presented at the 11th IBA International Arbitration 
Day and United Nations New York Convention Day, New York, February 2008) at 5; Bockstiegel, 
above n 69, at 178; and Garcia de Enterria, above n 67, at 394. Further, Buchanan's explanation of 
the aim of public policy, above n 60, at 513, ties in closely with the rationale behind arbitrability.   
71  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.114]. See also Born, above n 5, at 775-776 and Craig, Park, and  
Paulsson, above n 21, at [7.05]; Bockstiegel, above n 69, at 181; and section V(2) below at 48.  
72  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.114]. See also Born, above n 5, at 775-776 and Craig, Park, and  
Paulsson, above n 21, at [7.05]; and Buchanan, above n 60, at 514 and 519.  
73  Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at [559].  
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arguably appropriately separates the question of the law governing arbitrability, and thus 
arbitrability itself, from issues involving the choice of, or consent of, the parties.74  
 
In addition, public policy in this context can be viewed as performing a similar sort 
of overriding function to standard applications of public policy, in that the rule of 
transnational public policy modifies the base assumption of arbitrability.75 The use of 
public policy in this context therefore eliminates the arbitrability of certain disputes that 
would "contravene certain fundamental values or interests".  
 
It is not the place of this article to pronounce finally upon the question of the law 
governing arbitrability. Having examined the issues that arise, this article will proceed to 
examine in principle whether tax disputes should be arbitrable, and if so, to what extent.
 
In this sense, the article may be seen to provide a guide as to where a rule of public 
policy may fall, but the discussion is of broader application.  
III Taxation Disputes  
 
In order to determine whether taxation disputes should be arbitrable from a principled 
perspective, one must first understand the context in which such disputes arise. The 
question of the arbitrability of taxation disputes may arise in the context of three 
different kinds of dispute.  
A Disputes Between Two States 
 
Disputes between two states are governed by tax treaties.76 International tax treaties 
primarily concern double-taxation or tax cooperation.77 Arbitration is increasingly being 
encouraged as a means to resolve state-state disputes under these treaties.78  The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in particular, has 
                                                
74  Two points should be noted. First a lack of party consent may raise issues as to the source of the 
arbitrator's authority to use transnational public policy. See for example Michael Pryles "Reflections 
on Transnational Public Policy" (2007) 24 J Intl Arb 1 at 7. Second, the consent of the state still has 
a role to play more generally, given the consensus of states is required. In this regard, it is important 
to note that there is conceptually a difference between the consensus of states on a macro level, and 
the consent of a state – perhaps acting in a commercial capacity – to a particular provision on a 
micro level.  
75  Such an assumption seems appropriate given the ever-expanding nature of arbitrability.  
76  Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters "Arbitration in International 
Tax Matters" (29 August 2001) ST/SG/AC.8/2001/CRP.15 at 2. 
77  Thomas W Waelde and George Ndi "Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: 
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation" (1996) 31 Tex Intl LJ 215 at 427.  
78  See Waelde and George, above n 77, at 427; Cruz, above n 1, at 533; and Park "Arbitrability and 
Tax", above n 1, at [10-8]. 
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been pushing for the use of arbitration, recently incorporating an arbitration clause in the 
OECD Model Tax Treaty.79 Disputes of this nature are fundamentally distinct from those 
that this article is concerned with, in that they deal with a situation where states, in 
exercise of their sovereign right, have agreed to resolve tax disputes between them in a 
particular way, against the background of public international law. 
B Disputes Between Two Private Individuals 
 
These disputes are based on a contractual relationship between two private parties.80 The 
most straightforward scenario is where two private parties have a contract containing a 
provision allocating or "sharing a tax burden between" them.81 Other kinds of clauses 
may include those where it is stipulated that a contracting party cannot make a profit or 
loss as a result of any changes to the tax law of a state;82 or provisions stating that one 
party will pass on to, or seek for the other, any tax benefits that it receives.83 A dispute 
may then arise if the underlying tax position changes, or if one party breaches the 
contract.84 The only real limit on the kinds of disputes that may arise in this area is the 
creativity of those drafting the contracts.85 
                                                
79  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Publishing, 2010), art 25 (mutual 
agreement procedure). See also Cruz, above n 1, at 533; Michael J McIntyre "Comments on the 
OEDC Proposal for Secret and Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes" (2006) 7 Fla 
Tax Rev 622; Sed Crest "Why the OECD supports arbitration" International Tax Review (1 February 
2007); and OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty 
Disputes (Committee on Fiscal Affairs, February 2007).  
80  Luca CM Melchionna "Tax Disputes and International Commercial Arbitration" (2003) 74 Diritto e 
Pratica Tributaria Internazionale 769 at 774-786. See also Park "Arbitrability and Tax", above n 1, at 
[10-7]. 
81  Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at 359; and Melchionna, above n 80, at 773. See, for an example, 
Sub-Contractor v Contractor (Award) ICC 5759, 1989 cited in Melchionna, above n 80, at 776.  
82  See for example French Contractor v Libyan Employer in Sigvard Jarvin, Yves Derains and Jean-
Jacques Arnaldez Collection of ICC arbitral awards 1986-1990 (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, The Netherlands, 1994); and Melchionna, above n 80, at 774.  
83  See, for an example, Sub-Contractor v Contractor (Award) ICC 5759, 1989 cited in Melchionna, 
above n 80, at 776. 
84  See French Contractor v Libyan Employer, above n 82; and Melchionna, above n 80, at 775. For a 
hypothetical example of a kind of dispute that may arise see Thomas E Carbonneau and Andrew W 
Sheldrick "Tax Liability and Inarbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration" (1992) 1 J 
Transnatl L & Poly 23 at 24.  
85  For other examples, see generally Melchionna, above n 80.  
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C Disputes Between Investors and States 
1 Investment treaty arbitration 
 
In ITA investors can argue that changes in the taxation law of the host-state, which 
affect the investor, breach one of several treaty standards. For example, an investor may 
allege a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, if a tax is imposed on them 
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.86 An investor may also allege that tax laws are 
being used as a means of expropriation.87 William Park points out that "taxes lend 
themselves to characterization as a form of indirect or 'creeping' confiscation, which 
might in principle give rise to claims under investment treaty provisions related to 
expropriation and discrimination".88 These enquiries also fundamentally differ from 
those that this article will focus on. Like state-state disputes, these disputes are founded 
in treaties, although the private investor can invoke the rights within. As such, they are 
vertical in nature, involving the application of standards of international law.89 
2 International commercial arbitration 
 
In contrast, this article will focus on taxation disputes between investors and states that 
are horizontal in nature, being borne out of contractual relations. In order to do this, a 
greater understanding of the types of contracts and contractual clauses that may exist is 
required. The basic scenario that will be examined is a long-term concession contract 
between a host-state and an investor. A concession contract is one that "involves an 
agreement by a state to grant a privilege to conduct an enterprise of some sort for a 
defined period".90 The state transfers to the concessionaire "certain rights of powers 
which normally would belong to … the state"91 but "retains ultimate ownership of the 
right".92 These contracts therefore have a character that is partly public and partly 
                                                
86  See for example Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador (Award) (2004) 12 
ICSID Rep 59. But this standard is excluded with respect to taxation disputes in some treaties. See 
Walde and Kolo, above n 1, at 434. See also at 432 for more information on other kinds of treaty 
standard.  
87  Walde and Kolo, above n 1, at 425. 
88  Park "Arbitrability and Tax", above n 1, at [10-18]. See for example Encana v Republic of Ecuador 
(Award) (2006) 45 ILM 895.  
89  However, they provide a useful comparator. See section V(C)(1)(c)(i) below at 43. See also 
McLachlan, above n 50, at 294.  
90  Kenneth S Carlston "International Role of Concession Agreements" (1957-58) 52 NWULRev 618 at 
621.  
91  Homayoun Mafi "Iran's Concession Agreements and the Role of the National Iranian Oil Company: 
Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity" (2008) 48 Nat Resources J 407 at 409.  
92  Nicholas Miranda "Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to Public Policy" (2007) 117 
Yale LJ 510 at 512.  
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private.93 Long-term concession contracts usually concern major infrastructure projects 
or other significant projects, such as natural resource exploitation.
94
 The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development notes that "State contracts have played a major 
role in the foreign direct investment process".
95
  
 
Three types of contractual clauses concerning tax are prevalent in concession 
contracts between states and investors. These are: provisions providing that the foreign 
party will abide by the taxation law of the host-state, provisions providing that the host-
state grants some limited tax exemption or reduction to the private party for a period of 
time, and provisions providing for stabilisation of the legal framework.  
(a) Foreign party will abide by the tax law of the host-state 
 
The Production Sharing Agreement at issue in Heritage Oil's dispute with Uganda 
provides perhaps the best example of a general provision that stipulates that a foreign 
investor will abide by the taxation law of the host-state. Art 14 provided that:96  
 
All central, district, administrative, municipal and other local administrators or 
other taxes, duties, levies or other lawful impositions applicable to licensee shall be 
paid by the licensee in accordance with the laws of Uganda in a timely fashion.  
 
A mineral exploration agreement between the Republic of Liberia and Magma 
Mineral Resources Inc provides another example.97 Art 13.1 provided that:  
 
The Operator shall be liable to all taxes, fees, duties, excises, and other charges 
imposed by Liberian Laws of general application, except as may be otherwise 
provided by other laws and administrative regulations granting exemptions from 
customs duties and excise taxes.  
 
An agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and an Italian investor includes 
a similar provision.98 That provision demonstrates that there may be an overlap between 
                                                
93  Carlston, above n 90, at 621; Mafi, above n 91, at 414-415. See also Sapphire International 
Petroleum Ltd v National Iranian Oil Co (1967) 35 ILR 136.  
94  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development State Contracts 
(UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11, 2004) at 3 [UNCTAD]. See also Joachim G Frick Arbitration and 
Complex International Contracts (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001) at 4-5; and Carlston, 
above n 90, 621-622.  
95  UNCTAD, above n 94, at 1. See also Carlston, above n 90, at 643; and Frick, above n 94, at 4.  
96  Heritage Oil v Uganda Revenue Authority [2011] UGCommG 97.  
97  Mineral Exploration Agreement Between the Republic of Liberia and Magma Mineral Resources 
(26th October 2005), sourced from Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) 
<http://www.leiti.org.lr/>. 
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the types of clauses being described. This is because, in addition to providing for the 
payment of taxes in accordance with local law, it also stipulates that the foreign investor 
will not have to pay tax if it is exempted under the "Development Certificate". Indeed, 
perhaps the most plausible scenario is that any concession agreement will make use of a 
mix of the clauses regarding taxation being described.  
(b) Limited tax exemption or reduction for foreign party 
 
Many examples can be given of tax exemption or reduction clauses. For example, an 
agreement between the Republic of Liberia and China-Union (Hong Kong) Mining Co 
Ltd, provided a long list of tax exemptions in Art 14.3. These included being exempt 
from various taxes for the first 25 years,99 receiving a cap (by way of dollar amount) on 
another kind of tax payable for the first 10 years100 and having income tax capped at 25% 
for the first 25 years.101 Art 25 of the Production Sharing Agreement between the 
Republic of Togo and Oceanic Resources Ltd provides another good example, 
exempting Oceanic Resources Ltd from import taxes, duties and fees in reasonably 
detailed circumstances.102  
(c) Stabilisation clauses 
 
Stabilisation clauses "are found primarily in State contracts of long duration".103 They 
serve to minimise the political risk associated with contracting with a state that "has the 
power to change the relevant legislation or rules applicable to the contract".104 The state 
                                                                                                                                          
98  Concessions Agreement, in Joint Venture Form, Between the Government of Sierra Leone, 
Represented by its Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Guiseppe Lamarca of Turin, 
Italy, Managing Director of SILETI, Signed in Freetown, January 20, 1975, art 5.1.1 in Peter Fischer 
(ed) A Collection of International Concessions and Related Instruments: Contemporary Series 
(Volume 1, Oceanea Publications, United States of America, 1981) at 1. 
99  Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia, China-Union 
(Hong Kong) Mining Co Ltd and China-Union Investment (Liberia) Bong Mines Co Ltd (19 January 
2009) sourced from Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) 
<http://www.leiti.org.lr/> at art 14.3(b), (d) and (e).  
100  Art 14.3(g). 
101  Art 14.3(a). 
102  Production Sharing Agreement Between the Republic of Togo and Oceanic Resources Ltd, 4 August 
1977 in Peter Fischer (ed) A Collection of International Concessions and Related Instruments: 
Contemporary Series (Volume 7, Oceanea Publications, United States of America, 1981) at 243.  
103  Georges R Delaume Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts (Oceana Publications, Dobbs 
Ferry, NY, 1975) at 44.  
104  Frick, above n 94, at 174; Waelde and Ndi, above n 77, at 219 and 221; Delaume, above n 103, at 
15; Peter D Cameron International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at [2.19]; and Lorenzo Cotula "Reconciling regulatory stability and 
evolution of environmental standards in investment contracts: Towards a rethink of stabilization 
clauses" (2008) 1 JWEL & B 158 at 158. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the legal 
 LAUREN WAVENEY BRAZIER – LAWS 521 22
party agrees not to make changes to the law in a manner detrimental to the rights of the 
foreign investor.105 Georges Delaume puts forward the following as a "typical 
example":106 
 
Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, this Agreement … shall be 
construed and have effect in accordance with the Law of Ghana as it exists at the 
22nd day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixty two … 
 
However, the scope of a stabilisation clause is often limited.107 In particular, "the scope 
of the clause may be narrowed to specific matters, such as taxation".108 Tax clauses can 
therefore be "a specific form of stabilization clause, protecting one party against adverse 
changes in the law of taxation".109 In terms of the manner by which taxes are stabilised, 
this might take the form of a freezing provision, where tax laws are frozen in a manner 
similar to the clause above, or a consistency clause, where changes to the law only apply 
to the investment if they are "consistent with the investment contract".110 
 
Taxes can also be stabilised by various other means. For example, states will agree 
to set tax rates for the contractual arrangement, and stabilise those for the length of the 
agreement. This is what occurred in the Production Sharing Agreement between the 
Republic of Togo and Oceanic Resources Ltd,111 and the Foreign Investment Contract 
between the State of Chile and Noranda Mines Ltd.112 Further "governments will often 
agree that there will be no taxes other than those specified in the agreement".113 In the 
                                                                                                                                          
effect or validity of such clauses. This article will assume that such a clause is capable of binding the 
state and has a legal effect. However, it should be noted that there is much literature examining the 
real utility of stabilisation clauses.  
105  Frick, above n 94, at 174. 
106  Delaume, above n 103, at 45 citing Master Agreement of February 8, 1962 between the Government 
of Ghana and Volta Aluminium Company Limited (Valco), art 47. See also AFM Maniruzzaman 
"The pursuit of stability in international energy investment contracts: A critical appraisal of the 
emerging trends" (2008) 1 JWEL & B 121 at 123. 
107  Delaume, above n 103, at 46. 
108  Delaume, above n 103, at 46-47.  
109  Frick, above n 94, at 175.  
110  Cotula, above n 104, at 160. 
111  Production Sharing Agreement Between the Republic of Togo and Oceanic Resources Ltd, above n 
102, art 15, which provided that the tax rate would be set at 50% and stabilised "throughout the life" 
of the agreement. 
112  Foreign Investment Contract Between the State of Chile and Noranda Mines Limited, Signed at 
Santiago, Chile, 15 July 1977 in Peter Fischer (ed) A Collection of International Concessions and 
Related Instruments: Contemporary Series (Volume 7, Oceanea Publications, United States of 
America, 1981) at 220. In that agreement a detailed tax regime was set out, including a stable 
income tax rate of 49.5% for the 30 year duration of the agreement. 
113  Waelde and George, above n 77, at 224.  
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Republic of Liberia and Magma Mineral Resources Inc contract, the stabilisation clause 
went so far as to guarantee that anything not provided for by the agreement would be 
governed by the tax law of the host-state at the date the agreement came into effect.114 
This agreement serves to reinforce the likelihood of overlap between the types of tax 
clauses concession agreements contain. This is because it included a promise to pay the 
applicable taxes, various exemptions and tax reductions, and a comprehensive 
stabilisation clause.115  
 
Last, stabilisation clauses may take the form of an economic balancing provision, 
whereby the host-state promises that if there are any changes in the tax law applicable to 
the investor, these changes will be offset via other means.116 Such balancing provisions 
can take several different forms. One example, provided by AFM Maniruzzaman, is as 
follows:117  
 
In case of modifications to the tax regime … that have consequences on the 
economics of this Contract, a corresponding factor will be included in the 
production share percentages to absorb the increase or decrease in the tax burden. 
IV Taxation and Arbitrability 
A  The Exercise of Sovereign Authority 
 
The arbitrability of taxation disputes in the context of international commercial 
arbitration provides an interesting case study. This is because tax law is a direct exercise 
of the sovereign authority of a state. Conventionally, taxation has been viewed as 
indivisible from state sovereignty.118 It has not infrequently been argued that "the 
                                                
114  Mineral Exploration Agreement Between the Republic of Liberia and Magma Mineral Resources 
above n 97, art 14.4.  
115  For more examples of stabilisation provisions see Raymond Doak Bishop, James Crawford, William 
Michael Reisman Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2005) at 288-292. See also S K Chatterjee "The Stabilisation Clause Myth 
in Investment Agreements" (1988) 5 J Intl Arb 97.  
116  Cotula, above n 104, at 161.  
117  Maniruzzaman, above n 106, at 127-128. Maniruzzaman provides further examples of clauses of this 
kind.  
118  Roland Paris "The Globalization of Taxation? Electronic Commerce and the Transformation of the 
State" (2003) 47 International Studies Quarterly 153 at 153, 155 and 157; Diane M Ring "What's at 
Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation State" (2008-2009) 49 Va J Intl 
L 155 at 156; and Allison Christians "Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract" (Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series Paper No 1063, August 2008) at 7-8.  
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relationship between taxation and the emergence of the modern state was one of 'mutual 
constitution': taxes made the state, and the state made taxes."119  
 
To unpack this idea that taxation is indivisible from state sovereignty it is 
appropriate to examine conceptions of sovereignty found in public international law. In 
public international law the "competence of states in respect of their territory is usually 
described in terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction".120 Jurisdiction refers to the ability of 
a state to exercise control over people.121 It is a key ingredient of state sovereignty,122 
sovereignty being the basis of the nation state. Further:123 
 
If states … are conceived of as sovereign, then in this respect at least they are equal, 
and their sovereignty is in a major aspect a relation to other states (and to 
organizations of states) defined by law.  
 
These relations between states necessitate exceptions to the jurisdiction of states. It 
is in this respect that the doctrine of sovereign immunity arises. Sovereign immunity 
therefore refers to the idea that the actions of a foreign state lie outside the jurisdictional 
competence of other states.124 Whilst initially sovereign immunity was much broader, a 
doctrine of restrictive immunity has developed. This distinguishes between acts jure 
imperii (governmental acts) and acts jure gestionis (acts relating to the commercial 
activities of the state).125 Under this restrictive theory, immunity is only granted for acts 
jure imperii, as these acts are "unique to the state".126 This doctrine of restrictive 
immunity is now "solidified in practice" and widely accepted.127 The United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property reflects this 
solidification.128 
 
                                                
119  Paris, above n 118, at 157.  
120  James Crawford Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at 204.  
121  Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) at 645; 
and Crawford, above n 120, at 456.  
122  Shaw, above n 121, at 645; and Crawford, above n 120, at 456. 
123 Crawford, above n 120, at 447. 
124  Shaw, above n 121, at 699-700; Hans W Baade "The Operation of Foreign Public Law" (1995) 30 
Tex Intl L J 429 at 494; and Felix D Strebel "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Foreign 
Public Law" (1999) 21 Loy LA Intl and Comp L J 55 at 440. 
125  Shaw, above n 121, at 701; Crawford, above n 120, at 488; and Baade, above n 124, at 440. 
126  Shaw, above n 121, at 709; Crawford, above n 120, at 488; and Baade, above n 124, at 44.  
127  Matthew McMenamin "State Immunity Before the International Court of Justice: Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy) (2013) 44 VUWLR 189 at 192.  
128  United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (opened for 
signature 17 January 2005, not yet in force), art 10; McMenamin, above n 127, at 192-193; and 
Crawford, above n 120, at 490. 
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The important notion or facet of sovereignty for present purposes is that of acts jure 
imperii. When establishing what constitutes an act jure imperii the focus is on the nature 
of the act.129 It is well-established that exercise of taxation power is of the appropriate 
nature to constitute an act jure imperii. A "general tax claim" has been referred to as the 
"classic example of a sovereign or public right".130 This is because such a claim falls 
within the "categories of strictly political or public acts" which private citizens cannot 
undertake; for example: "internal administrative acts, [and] legislative acts".131 These 
acts were included by Hazel Fox in her "positive list of acts of a State classified as … 
acta jure imperii".132 While Fox did not specifically mention taxation, it is undoubtedly a 
"core governmental function" that would fall within this category.133 Indeed, there are 
clear links that exist between taxes and necessary state revenues, and between taxes and 
economic management.134 Due to these links "any significant diminution of the modern 
state's capabilities as a taxing entity could have important political, not merely economic 
consequences".135 It is therefore evident that the right to tax (or not to tax) remains 
"central to the idea of statehood" and sovereignty.136  
 
The fundamental link between sovereignty and taxation culminates in the concept 
of tax sovereignty which centres on "the premise that decisions about taxation should be 
made exclusively within nations, independent of outside concern and interference".137 
Essentially, tax sovereignty comprises a distinct facet of territorial sovereignty.138 While 
one dispute being resolved by arbitration may not impinge on tax sovereignty, "the 
totality of events could be troubling".139 Tax issues, under the sovereignty objection, 
therefore warrant protection from arbitrability. In particular, arbitrability might 
undermine the nation state or the system of nation states. This is analogous to the 
                                                
129  Shaw, above n 121, at 709-710. 
130  Baade, above n 124, at 479. See also Hersch Lauterpacht "The Problems of Jurisdictional 
Immunities of Foreign States" (1951) 28 BYBIL 220 at 237.  
131  Shaw, above n 121, at 709. 
132  Hazel Fox The Law of State Immunity (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 504. 
133  Fox, above n 132, at 523. 
134  Ring, above n 118, at 167-170.  
135  Paris, above n 118, at 157.  
136  Christians, above n 118, at 12 and Paris, above n 118, at 155.  
137  Christians, above n 118, at 2; and Charles E McLure Jr "Globalization, Tax Rules and National 
Sovereignty" (2001) 55 BFIT 328 at 328-329 (emphasis added).  
138  See for example Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, by Mr 
Sompong Sucharitkul Special Rapporteur [1984] vol 2, pt 1 YILC 5 at [84]: "The rationale behind 
the authority to tax or to collect levies lies in the supremacy of the territorial sovereign". 
139  Ring, above n 118, at 182. This sovereignty objection may be rephrased as a concern about the use 
of a private law mechanism to resolve a public law dispute, involving public rights that belong to 
society. See William W Park "Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of 
International Arbitration" (1986) 12 Brook J Intl L 629 at 637-638. 
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justification for sovereign immunity, which, as a "direct inference from the equality and 
independence of states" seeks to avoid the sovereignty of a state being "impugned".140  
 
Accordingly, the arbitrability of taxation disputes provides a starker illustration of 
the issues surrounding arbitrability than other areas, given taxation is so closely aligned 
with the exercise of government power.141 Further, the context of international 
commercial arbitration particularly highlights the issues due to the horizontal framework 
meaning disputes fall outside the realm of public international law, which is better 
equipped to deal with issues of sovereignty. 
B Other Concerns 
 
Two subsidiary arguments are made concerning the inappropriateness of arbitration for 
resolving taxation disputes. First, it has been argued that tax is a "speciality area" and 
therefore is not "susceptible to resolution by reference to commercial good sense" and 
should not be arbitrable.142 Second, concerns have been raised that deciding such 
disputes through arbitration will diminish the ability to create judicial precedent.143  
V  A Principled Approach  
A Drawing the Line 
 
It is suggested that a distinction should be drawn between disputes that involve the direct 
exercise of sovereign authority when it comes to taxation, and those that involve the 
indirect recognition of its effect on private or commercial relationships. Those that 
involve a direct exercise of sovereign authority should not be arbitrable. Conversely, 
those that involve the indirect recognition of the effect of tax laws should be. 
 
Another way to phrase this distinction is as a distinction between those disputes that 
concern the substantive tax law matters of a jurisdiction, and those which are based on 
specific contractual standards, despite implicating issues relating to taxation. Under this 
approach, disputes as to substantive tax law would be inarbitrable because they 
necessarily involve a direct exercise of sovereign authority. In contrast, the application 
of contractual standards, despite relating to tax, merely indirectly recognises the effect of 
tax laws, and therefore can be arbitrable. This appears to be the distinction drawn by 
                                                
140  Crawford, above n 120, at 488.  
141  Many statutory rules that have traditionally been considered non-arbitrable, such as bankruptcy, and 
patent law, are envisaged to apply between private parties. See Carbonneau and Janson, above n 4, at 
196.  
142  Carbonneau and Sheldrick, above n 84, at 33, 34 and 38. 
143  Park, above n 139, at 637.  
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Pascal Ancel, who wrote that substantive tax law issues are all "of too much importance 
for the State to be left for settlement by a private jurisdiction" and that:144  
 
even where – pursuant to the legal obligations arising under the contract and the 
principle of good faith – arbitrators are entitled to hold liable for damages a State 
which violates its obligations, they would not have the power to directly rule on the 
principle or amount of tax unduly imposed by the State. 
 
In undertaking this analysis it is useful to consider the proposed distinction in the 
context of the kinds of contractual provisions that arise. It is envisaged that this 
distinction will mean that a provision stating an investor will abide by the tax law of the 
host-state, on its own, would not lead to arbitrable tax disputes. This is because the 
disputes likely to arise around such provisions would require substantive determinations 
relating to the host-state's tax law. In contrast, a provision allowing for limited tax 
exemptions or reductions for the foreign party would be arbitrable, insofar as it requires 
a determination of compliance with the contractual standard, and not a determination of 
substantive tax law matters. This type of provision sits on the borderline. For example, a 
provision stating that tax payable on income is capped at a certain rate may raise 
substantive tax law issues, such as: what constitutes income? This determination 
involves a direct exercise of the state's sovereign authority over tax law. However, if the 
parties are agreed as to what constitutes income, compliance with this kind of provision 
could be arbitrable. This would involve merely the indirect effect of a tax law, in order 
to assess compliance with the contractual provision. Last, stabilisation provisions would 
be arbitrable following this distinction. This is because disputes that arise surrounding 
these provisions are likely to only involve questions of compliance with the contractual 
standard, i.e. whether the state has reneged on its promise of a stable framework. These 
disputes only indirectly recognise the effect of tax laws, although this is not to say that 
the determination is easy or that complex issues do not arise.145 
 
When examining the application of the distinction to the clauses discussed, what 
becomes clear is that the proposed distinction essentially creates a spectrum of 
situations, moving from non-arbitrable disputes to arbitrable disputes. Some disputes 
will more obviously be arbitrable or non-arbitrable, whereas others will lie in the middle 
of the spectrum and require a closer examination to determine whether they should be 
arbitrable or whether substantive tax issues are required to be resolved before the 
tribunal can decide the dispute.   
                                                
144  Pascal Ancel "Arbitrage et Ordre Public Fiscal" [2001] Revue de L'Arbitrage 269 at 227-278.  
145  See for example the issues in terms of the application of the stabilisation provision that arose in 
Duke Energy International Peru Investments No 1 Ltd v Republic of Peru (Award) ICSID 
ARB/03/28, 18 August 2008.  
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B  Justifications  
1 Sovereignty 
(a) Jure imperii vs jure gestionis 
 
Having established that a general tax claim falls within the purview of acts jure imperii, 
this section will examine how far this characterisation can take us in determining the 
appropriate limits on the use of sovereignty as a justification for the inarbitrability of tax 
disputes. It will argue that the distinction used in public international law between acts 
jure imperii and acts jure gestionis can, by analogy, provide useful support for the 
approach to the arbitrability of tax disputes proposed.  
 
While recognising that tax matters may in general be viewed as matters jure 
imperii, it must also be recognised that states undertake an array of commercial activities 
that do not directly impede their sovereignty.146 This makes defining the parameters of 
sovereignty particularly important in order to ensure that the scope of arbitrability is not 
too wide or narrow. This trade-off has been described by Baade as follows:147  
 
The customary international law rule of sovereign immunity illustrates the central 
importance of state sovereignty in the modern world. The restrictive theory of such 
immunity, on the other hand, demonstrates the need to accommodate respect for 
foreign sovereign rights to new circumstances, such as state trading. 
 
Therefore, there is something useful to be gained from applying the analogy of the 
jure imperii/jure gestionis distinction to investor-state tax disputes. To begin, it is 
important to note that, as with any distinction, there is "no clear cut dividing line 
between acts done jure imperii and acts done jure gestionis".148 Rosalyn Higgins 
identifies this as a "key problem" in this area.149 In the light of this, one must consider 
what indicators are available as to whether an act is jure imperii or jure gestionis.  
 
As previously mentioned, the focus is on the nature of the act, or by analogy, the 
dispute.150 According to James Crawford, this is to be construed as "precisely and 
                                                
146  Crawford, above n 120, at 488.  
147  Baade, above n 124, at 440.  
148  The Owners of the Ship 'Philippine Admiral' v Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd [1976] HKLR 512 
(PC) at 540. See also Steven Loble "Disputes with States" Law Gazette (Singapore, April 2011).  
149  Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How to Use It (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994) at 82.  
150  Higgins, above n 149, at 83. See also Littrell v United States of America [1995] 1 WLR 82 (CA) at 
89.  
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narrowly as is reasonably possible having regard to the factual and legal issues".151  He 
notes that "[i]f so described, the transaction can fairly be classified as a 'commercial 
transaction' … then the transaction will not lose that character or classification because 
extraneous facts or aspects surrounding the individual transaction suggest … a different 
classification". Further, Higgins points out that there is a "tendency to turn towards the 
test of whether an act is one that may be performed by anyone, or only a sovereign".152 
Ultimately, it is important to recognise that there is an element of making "value 
judgments which rest on political assumptions as to the proper sphere of state activities 
and of priorities in state policies" in applying the jure imperii/ jure gestionis 
distinction.153 
 
The English Court of Appeal judgment in Littrell v United States of America 
provides further guidance. In that case, the question was whether Mr Littrell could bring 
proceedings against the United States Government in the United Kingdom, for personal 
injury he suffered due to medical treatment received at a United States military hospital 
in the United Kingdom.154 The Court indicated that an act will be jure gestionis in 
circumstances where:155 
  
(a) it is necessary in the interests of justice to individuals having such transactions 
with states to allow them to bring such transactions before the courts; (b) to require 
a state to answer a claim based upon such transactions does not involve a challenge 
to or inquiry into any act of sovereignty or governmental act of that state. It is, in 
accepted phrases, neither a threat to the dignity of the state, nor any interference 
with its sovereign functions. 
 
Further, in deciding whether the act was jure imperii or jure gestionis on the facts of the 
case, Hoffmann LJ stated that:156  
 
The context in which the act took place was the maintenance by the United States 
of a unit of the United States Air Force in the United Kingdom. This looks about as 
imperial an activity as could be imagined. But it would be facile to regard this 
context as determinative of the question. Acts done within that context could range 
from arrangements concerning the flights of the bombers – plainly jure imperii – to 
ordering milk for the base from a local dairy or careless driving by off-duty airmen 
on the roads of Suffolk. Both of the latter would seem to me to be jure gestionis, 
                                                
151  James Crawford "International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions" 
[1984] British Yearbook of International Law 75 at 96. 
152  Higgins, above n 149, at 83.  
153  Crawford, above n 151, at 89. 
154  Littrell, above n 150, at 82.  
155  Loble, above n 148; and Littrell, above n 150, at 89. 
156  At 94-95. 
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fairly within an area of private law activity. I do not think that there is a single test 
or 'bright line' by which cases on either side can be distinguished. Rather, there are 
a number of factors which may characterise the act as nearer to or further from the 
central military activity. 
 
His Honour's method demonstrates clearly Crawford's point that it is important to 
define the act as precisely as possible.157 This is because it shows that on a first look the 
act might appear to be on one side of the line, whereas when examined more closely it 
might fall on the other. That this is the correct approach was affirmed by the House of 
Lords in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe.158 It is suggested that based on these tests the 
resolution of substantive tax law issues fall on the jure imperii side of the line, whereas 
the resolution of disputes that only indirectly concern taxation, and are essentially based 
on contractual standards, fall on the jure gestionis side of the line. 
 
Accordingly, in the context of tax disputes a broad approach will not suffice in 
distinguishing between jure imperii and jure gestionis. Such an approach may lead in 
either direction, depending on how it is framed. First, state contracts as to foreign 
investment viewed broadly involve the state acting in its commercial capacity, as 
opposed to its sovereign capacity. The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property makes explicit that investment contracts constitute commercial 
transactions.159 But this approach only goes so far. For example, where a contract 
provides for the arbitration of tax disputes this may bring in issues of jure imperii. 
Looking solely at the fact that a dispute involves taxation indirectly or directly, and 
therefore appears to be an act jure imperii suffers from the same issue of being too broad 
an enquiry. Within the heading of tax disputes, there are a range of types of dispute 
which must be considered. This can be analogised to the situation in Littrell where 
within the operation of the United States military in the United Kingdom, a range of 
actions were taken, only some of which were jure imperii.  
 
Drilling deeper requires an examination of the range of disputes. As already 
discussed, the kinds of tax dispute that may arise may be divided between those that 
involve substantive tax law issues, and those that involve the application of a contractual 
standard to the dispute. Only the former category can be analogised to acts jure imperii 
and therefore defended from arbitrability on the basis of sovereignty. The latter, are the 
                                                
157  This is often referred to as the process of individuation: Fox, above n 132, at 515; and Roger 
O'Keefe and Christian J Tams (eds) The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 66-67. 
158  Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573 (HL) at 1577.  
159  At least with respect to article 17: United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property (opened for signature on 17 January 2005, not yet in force), annex to the 
Convention with respect to article 17. See also O'Keefe, above n 157, at 277. 
THE ARBITRABILITY OF INVESTOR-STATE TAXATION DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 
31
sorts of transactions where there is no challenge or threat to state sovereignty if the 
disputes are arbitrable.160  
 
Further, provisions that merely involve contractual standards are not limited to the 
state. In other words, while a state may enter into a contract containing a contractual 
stabilisation clause, so too may two private investors, whereby one agrees to indemnify 
the other against any change in the underlying circumstances. In contrast, only a state 
can exercise a taxing power. Thus the jure imperii/ jure gestionis analogy suggests that 
sovereignty as a reason for inarbitrability only supports the inarbitrability of those 
disputes that involve a substantive application of tax law.  
(b) Waiver of sovereignty? 
 
Following through the analogy, it remains to be considered what the position would be if 
a state 'waived its sovereignty' by signing up to an arbitration clause explicitly providing 
for the arbitration of substantive tax law disputes. This is where the analogy becomes 
less apt, as assessing this from a jurisdictional basis one would assume that the state 
would be able to waive its sovereignty over substantive tax law issues and allow the 
tribunal to decide. However it is not a satisfying intellectual answer to the question of 
arbitrability to say that a dispute becomes arbitrable when a party agrees to it.161 This 
conflates the issue of arbitrability with jurisdiction.  
 
Nonetheless, this may be exactly the position in the context of investor-state 
contracts. The answer to this dilemma relates closely to the questions of governing 
law.162 If the law governing arbitrability is that of the state in question, even if its law 
states substantive tax law issues are inarbitrable, it is likely the state would be precluded 
from relying on this fact. This may suggest that in this circumstance, the state could 
waive its sovereignty, and a convergence would occur between the scope of the 
arbitration agreement and arbitrability.   
 
If the law governing arbitrability is that of the seat or transnational public policy, 
then it is unlikely the host-state waiving its sovereignty with respect to substantive tax 
disputes would effect the question of arbitrability. This is due to the broader implications 
for state sovereignty generally and the interaction between states that can be gauged 
when assessing how the proposed distinction squares with the rule against foreign 
enforcement of revenue laws.  
 
                                                
160  See Littrell, above n 150, at 89. It is also important that they be arbitrable to allow justice to 
investors. 
161  See section II(B)(1) above at 8.  
162  See section II(B) above at 7.  
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On this view, however, there is also likely to be a convergence between the scope 
of the arbitration agreement and arbitrability. This is because, in practice, it seems 
unlikely that states would submit to an arbitration clause that explicitly agrees to 
arbitrate substantive tax disputes. Because of this it is likely construing the scope of a 
general arbitration provision will reach the same result dictated by concerns of 
arbitrability. In some senses, arbitrability in this context becomes bound up with issues 
of contractual interpretation. From a practical perspective, this convergence is 
understandable. It makes little sense for a tribunal to broadly construe an arbitration 
clause, only to have to then consider the limiting function of arbitrability separately. 
Indeed, it has been proposed more generally that the two facets of an arbitrator's hybrid 
authority – the contractual basis deriving from the parties (i.e. jurisdiction) and the 
authority "as permitted to exist or as assisted by state authority" (i.e. arbitrability) "are in 
the process of assimilating each other".163 
(c)  Rule against foreign enforcement of revenue laws 
 
The last thing that remains to be considered is how the broader implications for state 
sovereignty alluded to would occur if substantive tax disputes were arbitrable. This will 
be done through a discussion of how the proposed distinction squares with the rule 
against foreign enforcement of revenue laws in private international law. It has long 
been established, almost universally, that "the courts of one country will not enforce the 
penal and revenue laws of another country".164 Indeed, in 1775 Lord Mansfield stated 
that "no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another".165 This is an 
application of the broader principle that "enforcement jurisdiction may not be exercised 
in the territory of any other State without the consent of that State".166 
 
Various rationales have been given for the rule against the foreign enforcement of 
revenue laws. The primary reason concerns state sovereignty, highlighting that matters 
concerning tax law sit on the borderline between private international law and public 
                                                
163  Bernard G Poznanski "The Nature and Extent of an Arbitrator's Powers in International Commercial 
Arbitration" (1987) 4 J Intl Arb 71 at 72.  
164  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-020] and [5R-019]; CMV Clarkson and Jonathan Hill The Conflict of Laws 
(4th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) at 49; John O'Brien Conflict of Laws (2nd ed, 
Cavendish, London, 1999) at 152; and FA Mann "Conflict of Laws and Public Law" (1971) 132 
Recueil de Cours 107 at 166. See generally Municipal Council of Sydney v Bull [1909] 1 KB 7.  
165  Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 98 ER 1120 (KB) at 1121. 
166  Malcolm D Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 335. 
See also Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 490.  
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international law.167 This justification was best put in Government of India v Taylor. In 
that case, Lord Keith of Avonholm stated that:168 
 
One explanation for the rule thus illustrated may be thought to be that enforcement 
of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which imposed the 
taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory 
of another … is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent 
sovereignties. 
 
In this regard, Lord Somervell of Harrow drew a distinction between contractual claims 
and administrative claims:169   
 
Our courts will apply foreign law if it is the proper law of a contract, the subject of 
a suit. Tax gathering is not a matter of contract but of authority and administration 
as between the State and those within its jurisdiction.  
 
Accordingly "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of 
government of another done within its own territory".170 This links into a second 
justification given for the rule. That is, disputes of this nature are best reserved for the 
"political branches of government".171 In the words of Judge Learned Hand:172 
 
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another State is, or at any rate 
should be, beyond the powers of the court; it involves the relations between the 
States themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal … 
 
Thus, by prohibiting a foreign state from seeking to rely directly on its own revenue law 
in the courts of another state,173 the revenue rule protects the courts in preventing them 
from "scrutinizing foreign tax laws", and protects the relationship of mutual respect 
                                                
167  Baade, above n 124, at 60. 
168  Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491 (HL) at 511. See also, Dicey, above n 22, at [5-020], 
[5-021] and [5-032]; and Mann, above n 164, at 168. 
169  Government of India v Taylor, above n 168, at 514. See also Dicey, above n 22, at [5-029]; and 
Baade, above n 124, at 478: "A foreign sovereign seeking to collect a tax deficiency abroad is not 
(except perhaps, in political theory) attempting to enforce a contractual obligation." 
170  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-046]. 
171  Symeon C Symeonides "Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001: Fifteenth Annual Survey" 
(2002) 50 Am J Comp L 1 at 7. 
172  Moore v Mitchell 30 F 2d 600 (2d Cir 1929) at 604. See also Government of India v Taylor, above n 
168, at 511.  
173  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-025]. Foreign judgments for taxes will not be enforced on the basis of this 
rule: Dicey, above n 22, at [14-R020] and [14-022]; and Clarkson and Hill, above n 164, at 174 See 
also Colt industries Inc v Sarlie (No 2) [1966] 1 WLR 1287 (CA). 
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between states from the results that could occur if this kind of adjudication were 
allowed.174  
 
Following on from this, an important distinction is drawn between the enforcement 
and recognition of foreign revenue laws. While the enforcement (direct or indirect) of 
foreign revenue laws is prohibited, the recognition of foreign revenue laws is not.175 The 
rule allows a foreign revenue law to be recognised where it is relevant to the issue at 
hand, and there is no issue of enforcement.176 For example "a contract invalid according 
to a … revenue law of its applicable law … may be held to be invalid or 
unenforceable".177  
 
It is suggested that the distinction proposed for the arbitrability of tax disputes is 
entirely consistent with the distinction between recognition and effect. Enforcement 
being prohibited under the revenue rule is akin to the non-arbitrability of substantive tax 
law issues. The rationale behind both is the fact that the direct exercise of sovereign 
authority is implicated. Further, the recognition of the effect of revenue laws is akin to 
the arbitrability of contractual disputes once the underlying tax law issues are decided. 
This is because, under this approach, the effect of the tax law is recognised in order to 
make a determination as to the contractual dispute, but arbitrators are not required to 
make decisions on substantive tax law matters.  
 
Aside from the analogies to be drawn, the proposed distinction makes sense from a 
practical perspective, considering the existence of the revenue rule. The inarbitrability of 
substantive tax law disputes mitigates any potential issues that could arise with respect 
to enforcement of an award. If this were not the position it seems that two options would 
arise. Either the arbitrability of substantive tax disputes would allow the New York 
Convention to be used to both avoid and undermine the foreign revenue rule,178 or courts 
                                                
174  Symeonides, above n 171, at 6 and 7. See also Baade, above n 124, at 483: Another justification 
given for the rule is that the complexity of tax law makes "[t]he even-handed application of such a 
body of law by a foreign court of general jurisdiction" challenging. 
175  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-023]-[5-025]; and O'Brien, above n 164, at 153. 
176  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-031]; and O'Brien, above n 164, at 154. 
177  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-024]. The Act of State doctrine posits a similar distinction between directly 
ruling on the validity of acts of a sovereign state, and indirectly recognising the effect of such acts 
where no question of validity arises. See Yukos Capital SarL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2011] 
EWHC 1461 (Comm) at [122]-[131]. 
178  See Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The 
Government of Mongolia (Award on Jurisdiction and Liability) Marc Lalonde, Horacia A Grigera 
Naon and Brigitte Stern 28 April 2011, at [695] where this possibility is discussed, and advanced as 
a reason for refusing to arbitrate the substantive tax counterclaims made by Mongolia. See also 
Computer Sciences Corp v Iran (Award) (1986) 10 Iran-US CT Rep 269 at 312-313 where the 
Tribunal refused what was in essence a request for a declaration of taxes owed on this basis.   
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may develop the public policy exception to enforcement under the New York 
Convention to refuse enforcement of arbitral awards that essentially seek to enforce a 
foreign revenue law in another jurisdiction.179 Neither of these positions would be 
desirable. In the former scenario, the New York Convention could essentially be 
transformed into a revenue-collecting device. This is not something that could have been 
conceived of at the time the Convention was drafted, and could be said to transform its 
nature.180 The latter scenario is undesirable, as it would see tribunals rendering awards 
that were unenforceable.181 Thus, practically speaking, it is clear that it is important to 
find a solution consistent with the foreign revenue rule.  
 
While it may be viewed as old-fashioned to rely on the foreign revenue rule due to 
the fact that "substantial inroads" have been made into it by treaties and other reciprocal 
arrangements, the rule still exists as a general principle, and is particularly relevant in 
those situations where no such inroads exist.182 Further, the rule is derogated from 
against the backdrop of public international law. The fact that states have, in the exercise 
of their sovereign authority, agreed with other states to modify the rule on a reciprocal 
basis does not provide any insight into the ability of an arbitral tribunal established by 
contract to decide tax disputes, or into the issues with enforcing such awards under the 
New York Convention.  
 
At best the inroads made into the rule could be viewed as decreasing the scope of 
the problems regarding enforceability of such awards. However, these inroads do not 
remove the fundamental issues that exist. This is because the enforcement of arbitral 
awards is likely outside the scope of many such agreements, some of which just deal 
with foreign judgments, or administrative assistance, meaning the foreign revenue rule 
may still be a relevant consideration with respect to arbitral awards.183 Further, the 
                                                
179  The United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959), art 
V(2)(b). This development would likely be done on the basis that it "can hardly be supposed that 
foreign arbitral awards will be more readily enforced or recognised … than are foreign judgments": 
Dicey, above n 22, at [16-123]. 
180  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law "1958 – Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – the 'New York' Convention: Objectives" 
UNCITRAL <www.uncitral.org>.  
181  Baade, above n 124, at 477.  
182  Dicey, above n 22, at [5-022] and [5-029]. See generally Brenda Mallinak "The Revenue Rule: A 
Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century" (2006) 17 Duke J Comp & Intl L 79 at 94 and 
Strebel, above n 124, at 78. See for example OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
(OECD Publishing, 2010), art 27; Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 (NZ), s 3(3A); 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (NZ), s 68; and Protocol amending the US-Japan Income Tax 
Treaty 2003 (signed 24 January 2013, yet to be ratified) amongst others. 
183  See the examples given in n 182, above. See also Directive 2010/24/EU concerning mutual 
assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures 2010 OJ L 84/1, 
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enforcement of arbitral awards regarding substantive tax issues could lead to similar 
issues against the backdrop of state-state agreements as it does against the backdrop of 
the foreign revenue rule. This is because enforcement of arbitral awards could be used to 
circumvent the limits or defined scope of those agreements, in the same way it might be 
used to circumvent the application of the foreign revenue rule, implicating similar issues 
for the system of sovereign states. As a result, the ability of states to derogate from the 
foreign revenue rule does not detract from the arguments made based on the rule as to 
how far a tribunal established in contract can and should go, unarmed by the lex 
specialis of a treaty.184  
 
2  The nature of tax law  
 
The concern that tax law is a complex or speciality area, and as such should not be 
subject to arbitration, can be usefully explored by a more in depth consideration of the 
nature of tax law. The nature of tax law suggests that it is indeed different from other 
areas of law. Indeed, tax law has been described as a "structure built on sand"; 
"illogical" and "incomprehensible".185 Compared to other areas of law, tax law is less 
able to match the legal rules to the factual situation or subject-matter that it governs.186 
This is because of the issues associated with defining economic gains in order to allow 
                                                                                                                                          
preamble (7). See further Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters ETS 127 (opened for signature 25 January 1988, entered into force 1 
April 1995); Protocol amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters CETS 208 (opened for signature 27 May 2010, entered into force 1 June 2011).  
184  Further, while this rule has been criticised on various bases that lie beyond the scope of this article, it 
does not appear to be going anywhere. Regarding criticisms, see generally O'Brien, above n 164, at 
152; Anatol Dutta "Civil Claims of Foreign Sovereigns for Lost Taxes: The Big Tobacco Cases and 
the Revenue Rule" (2006) 7 EBOR 697; William J Kovatch Jr "Recognizing Foreign Tax 
Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule" (2000) 22 Hous J Intl L 265; 
Lawrence Collins "Professor Lowenfeld and the Enforcement of Foreign Public Law" (2009) 42 
International Law and Politics 125; Adrian Briggs "Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: 
Rethinking the Law on Foreign Judgments" (2004) 8 SYBIL 1; and Strebel, above n 124. Regarding 
the prevalence of the rule, see for example the recent decision in Tullow Uganda Ltd v Heritage Oil 
and Gas Ltd, Heritage Oil plc [2013] EWHC 1656 (Comm) at [115]. See further Baade, above n 
124, at 485; and Mann, above n 164, at 168.  
185  See generally John Prebble "Income Taxation, A Structure Built on Sand" (2002) 24 Syd LR 301 
[Structure Built on Sand]; John Prebble "Ectopia, Tax Law, and International Taxation" [1997] BTR 
383 [Ectopia and International Taxation]; and John Prebble "Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible?" 
[1994] BTR 380 [Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible]. See also John Prebble "General Anti-
avoidance Rules as Regulatory Rules of the Fiscal System: suggestions for improvements to the 
New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule" in Susy Frankel and Deborah Ryder (eds) 
Recalibrating Behaviour: Smarter Regulation in a Global World (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2013) 
[GAARs as Regulatory Rules]. 
186  Prebble "Structure Built on Sand", above n 185, at 305 and 308.  
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them to be taxed.187 For example, economically speaking, profits or gains do not 
discriminate as to geography in the same way a state must if it seeks to operate a tax 
system. Economic gains do not exist in a particular space. However, for the purposes of 
tax law, gains need to be attributed to a particular jurisdiction.188 It is impossible to 
resolve this tension.189 As a result tax law can never be truly coherent.190 
 
Due to these fundamental issues John Prebble reaches the following conclusions 
regarding the nature of tax law. First, he notes that "tax law tends to be ad hoc and 
incoherent, in the sense of lacking internal consistency" and that it "suffers from a lack 
of general principles that are usable".191 Second, he notes that "income tax law may be 
law as tax specialists know law, but it is not law as other people know it".192  
 
These conclusions give credence to the assertion that tax disputes should be 
inarbitrable as tax is a speciality area. While arbitral tribunals frequently deal with 
complex areas of law, and courts have increasingly pronounced faith in the ability of 
arbitrators to do so,193 the lack of coherence in tax law, both in statutory rules and 
judicial decisions, suggests that the nature of tax law is beyond that of mere complexity: 
cases are contradictory, outcomes hard to predict, and issues of policy are clearly 
implicated in the arbitrary line drawing that can occur.194 This makes it inappropriate for 
an arbitral tribunal to make rulings on a nation's substantive tax law matters. As 
Carbonneau and Sheldrick note, outside the ordinary tax resolution processes of a 
country "there may be little room for predictable outcomes and accurate processes" 
which surely undermines the goals of arbitration: "[achieving] efficiency and 
expertise".195  
3 Transparency 
 
The last direct concern to address is the effect of the arbitrability of tax disputes on 
judicial precedent. It is suggested that deciding substantive tax law disputes outside of 
                                                
187  Prebble "Structure Built on Sand", above n 185, at 305.  
188  Prebble "Why Is Tax Law Incomprehensible", above n 185, at 385. 
189  Prebble "Why Is Tax Law Incomprehensible", above n 185, at 391.  
190  This concept was termed "ectopia" by John Prebble. This means "'displacement' or 'dislocation'". It 
is particularly prevalent in tax law concerning business income. See Prebble "GAARs as Regulatory 
Rules", above n 185, at [10.5]; Prebble "Structure Built on Sand", above n 185, at 305-306. 
191  Prebble "GAARs as Regulatory Rules", above n 185, at [10.5].  
192 Prebble "Structure Built on Sand", above n 185, at 311. 
193  See for example Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc 473 US 614 (1985) at 3355 
and 3357-3358. 
194  Ectopia is likely the cause of the similar factors described by Carbonneau and Sheldrick, above n 84, 
at 38-39.  
195  Carbonneau and Sheldrick, above n 84, at 39-40.  
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the court and tax system undermines the efficacy of the system. While the argument that 
the public resolution of disputes fertilises judicial precedent has been countered with the 
argument that "courts elaborate the law to deal with disputes; they do not entertain 
litigation in order to permit lawyers to elaborate the law",196 concerns regarding the 
effect on judicial precedent remain defensible. This is because the development of 
judicial precedent creates a transparent process, whereas commercial arbitrations are 
usually kept confidential.197 Transparency is particularly important where matters of 
taxation are involved. There are two reasons for this. The first is a rule of law point, and 
the second is a parity of treatment point. 
 
An important facet of the rule of law is that the law must be accessible.198 This 
allows people to predict how the law may apply to their particular situation.199 It is 
especially important to have accessible decisions in the area of tax given the incoherent 
nature of tax law. In order for taxpayers to be able to predict how specific tax laws will 
be applied for them, it is often essential to have recourse to court decisions.200 Of course, 
due to the ad hoc nature of tax law, one may never be fully sure of the outcome, but the 
availability of judicial precedent certainly serves to mitigate some of the uncertainty that 
may arise in this area.  
 
Further, the "consistency of arbitral decisions" is "closely connected with the issue 
of transparency".201 This encompasses the idea that "like cases [should] be treated alike" 
                                                
196  Park, above n 139, at 637. 
197  Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel "Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? 
The Lalive Lecture 2012" (2012) 28 Arb Intl 577 at 586. 
198  Harry Ebersohn "Tax Avoidance and the Rule at Law" (paper presented to Legal Research 
Foundation Tax Avoidance Symposium, Auckland, April 2011) at [10]; Harry Ebersohn "Tax 
Avoidance and the Rule of Law" [2012] NZLR 243 at 246; Vaughan Lowe "Res judicata and the 
Ryle of Law in International Arbitration" (1996) 8 Afr J Intl Comp L 38 at 48 and Thomas Bingham 
"The Rule of Law" (2007) 66 CLJ 67 at 69 -70. 
199  Bockstiegel, above n 197, at 587. 
200  It is important to briefly mention the role of tax advisory or guidance notes. The existence of these 
notes both confirms that the incoherency of tax law as an issue, and mitigates concerns with respect 
to taxpayers being able to determine how the law applies to them. However, crucially, such notes 
represent the non-binding view of the tax department as to the interpretation of the law, not 
necessarily the view of the courts. Judicial precedent therefore still has an important role to play. See 
for example US Inland Revenue Service "Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance" (4 
September 2013) IRS <www.irs.gov>; US Inland Revenue Service "Understanding IRS Guidance – 
A Brief Primer" (14 March 2013) IRS <www.irs.gov>/; Australian Taxation Office "Rulings and 
ATO View" (15 October 2007) Australian Government: Australian Taxation Office 
<www.ato.gov.au>; and Australian Taxation Office "Precedential ATO Views" (29 October 2012) 
Australian Government: Australian Taxation Office <www.ato.gov.au>. 
201  Bockstiegel, above n 197, at 587. 
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and that "inconsistent decisions violate the parties' rights to justice".202 However, the 
parity of treatment point goes beyond the mere inconsistency of decisions, which is a 
problem courts also face with respect to the determination of substantive tax law 
matters. The key point here is that transparency is important in order to allow taxpayers, 
whether they are in similar circumstances, or different circumstances, to determine that 
they are receiving parity of treatment. There "is a public interest in seeing that the 
parties have been treated fairly" and in taxpayers knowing whether they are being 
treated in a consistent manner to others.203 
 
It is for these reasons then, that concerns about the fertilisation of judicial precedent 
remain justified when it comes to the arbitrability of tax disputes. These concerns are 
particularly acute for the direct exercise of sovereign authority in the area of taxation, 
but are not so acute for disputes that merely recognise the effects of tax law. This is 
because disputes merely recognising the effects of tax law are unlikely to be affected by 
the complex nature of tax law. They are therefore likely to be more predictable, and 
subject to fewer concerns about parity of treatment.  
C Further Support 
1 Existing case law  
 
While there is no strict doctrine of precedent in international commercial arbitration it is 
useful to examine whether the case law (both judicial and arbitral) supports the proposed 
distinction. This article will first examine disputes founded in contract. Not only does 
the case law in this area support the arbitrability of contractual disputes indirectly 
involving taxation, but it also suggests that those disputes which implicate matters of 
sovereignty directly will not be arbitrable.  
 
This article will then consider cases involving tax disputes from the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal and ITA by way of comparison. An examination of these cases is best kept 
distinct, given they involve vertical relationships, being decided against the backdrop of 
public international law.204 While dealing primarily with jurisdictional issues in the light 
of this, these cases operate on a similar distinction to that being proposed, demonstrating 
that such a distinction is workable in practice. They also show similar policy 
                                                
202  Lowe, above n 198, at 47-48. 
203  Lowe, above n 198, at 48. Arguably this is particularly important for substantive tax issues, given 
these involve the exercise of sovereignty and relations between the state and its people. See 
generally Barbara Delcourt "Sovereignty" in Encyclopedia of Governance (SAGE Reference, 
Thousand Oaks, California, 2007) at 910-914; Gus van Harten "The Public-Private Distinction in the 
International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State" (2007) 56 ICLQ 371 at 376; and 
Ring, above n 118, at 158, 159 and 170. 
204  McLachlan, above n 50, at 294.  
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considerations to those discussed in this article in operation. Further, there is a good 
argument to be made that the jurisdictional inquiry in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is 
analogous to arbitrability, thus providing even more support for the proposed distinction.  
(a) Cases demonstrating contractual disputes are clearly arbitrable 
 
Two cases demonstrate that contractual disputes implicating matters of taxation are 
arbitrable. These are AED Oil Limited v Puffin FPSO Limited,205 and Petrola Hellas v 
The Greek State.206 
 
AED Oil v Puffin is a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court, in Australia. The 
case concerned an agreement between two private parties. A dispute arose regarding the 
tax indemnification clause in the contract. In the course of the proceedings, it was 
submitted that the subject-matter of the dispute was not arbitrable, as it involved 
"statutory obligations" as well as "third party interests and public policy considerations". 
In considering this argument, Judd J made it clear that the dispute was capable of 
settlement by arbitration, because it was "in form and substance, a contractual dispute". 
This was in spite of the "existence of the underlying tax issue". 
 
Petrola Hellas was an international commercial arbitration concerning an 
agreement between the Greek State and an investor. The agreement stipulated in art 
10(4) that "any subsequent law imposing new taxes or customs duties was not applicable 
to Petrola, unless the new legislation created a more favourable taxation regime".207 This 
agreement was confirmed by legislative decree, and therefore became law.208 
Subsequently, a once off extraordinary tax was imposed. The Tribunal considered 
whether Petrola was liable to pay the tax and concluded that the tax could not be applied 
as Petrola was "exempted by virtue of Art 10(4)".209 Second, the Tribunal stated that in 
the alternative, it would have found the Greek State "liable for damages on the ground 
that it had, in the exercise of its sovereign right, unilaterally cancelled its contractual 
obligations".210 Such damages would have been awarded "on the strength of the 
principles of good faith".211 
 
                                                
205  AED Oil Limited v Puffin FPSO Limited [2009] VSC 534. 
206  Petrola Hellas v The Greek State (Award) (1978) 11 Ybk Comm Arb 105. 
207  At 106.  
208  At 105 and 106. 
209  At 107.  
210  At 107.  
211  At 107.  
THE ARBITRABILITY OF INVESTOR-STATE TAXATION DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 
41
This case represents a reasonably clear application of a contractual stabilisation 
provision.212 It is perhaps arguable that Petrola Hellas was founded on the fact that the 
contractual provision had been converted into law, but the alternative analysis provided 
by the Tribunal seems to suggest that a claim founded solely on contract also would 
have succeeded, albeit via a different route. The difference here is minimal in terms of 
final outcome. 
(b) Cases demonstrating disputes implicating sovereignty are not arbitrable 
 
The next group of cases add to those showing contractual provisions are clearly 
arbitrable by indicating that those implicating sovereignty directly are not. This 
additional layer gives rise to the proposed distinction, which is highlighted in some of 
these cases. There are four cases that warrant mentioning: Owner of a Lebanon Co v 
African State;213 Duke v Peru;214 Engineering Co (Italy) v Engineering Co (Greece)215 
and French Contractor v Libyan Employer.216 
 
Owner of a Lebanon Co was an international commercial arbitration, concerning 
contractual relations between the Lebanon Co and an African State. When disputes 
relating to taxation arose, the Tribunal stated, affirming the above, that it had 
"jurisdiction to decide all contractual matters falling within the scope of the arbitration 
clause, even when such matters are relevant to the tax court".217 It then went on to note 
that drawing a distinction between contractual matters and other matters:218 
 
[allowed] the arbitral tribunal to respect both the arbitration clause conferring upon 
it the power to decide disputes relating to agreements between parties, and the 
exclusive jurisdiction of State courts in tax matters. 
 
In saying this, as Melchionna points out, the Tribunal managed to avoid any issues 
surrounding tax sovereignty by "declaring the nature of the claims not as tax claims but 
as mere contractual ones".219 However, this case still clearly stands for the idea that only 
disputes involving contractual standards are capable of being resolved by arbitration, 
                                                
212  See also Kaiser Bauxite Co v Jamaica (1999) 1 ICSID Rep 296, at 303. This decision also assumes 
that contractual disputes relating to stabilisation clauses will be arbitrable. Unfortunately nothing 
further can be drawn from this dispute as the matter was subsequently settled between the parties. 
213  Owner of a Lebanon Co v African State (Award) (1992) 20 Yk Comm Arb 58. 
214  Duke Energy International Peru Investments No 1 Ltd v Republic of Peru, above n 145. 
215  Engineering Co (Italy) v Engineering Co (Greece) (1999) 24 Ybk Comm Arb 80. 
216  French Contractor v Libyan Employer, above n 82. 
217  At [2]. 
218  At [3].  
219  Melchionna, above n 80, at 786. 
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and it is appropriate for states to have exclusive jurisdiction in the resolution of 
substantive tax matters.220  
 
Similar observations were made in the Engineering Co and French Contractor 
cases. These both involved disputes between private parties, regarding which party 
should bear the burden of taxes. In Engineering Co the dispute arose because the 
underlying tax position turned out to be different to that assumed when contracting,221 
and in French Contractor the dispute arose when the tax position changed, and the 
French Contractor sought to rely on the contractual stipulation that it would "neither 
gain a profit nor suffer any loss as a result of changes" to the law.222 In each case the 
defendant contended that the dispute was concerned with substantive tax issues, and 
therefore inarbitrable.223  
 
In French Contractor, while the issues relating to arbitrability were not fully 
fleshed out,224 the Tribunal noted that "[a]s far as Libyan taxation is concerned, it is 
entirely a matter for the [Libyan] authorities" and declined to give a decision.225 This is 
presumably because the determination of the dispute would have involved the Tribunal 
determining how much tax the employer owed under Libyan tax law.226  
 
In contrast, Engineering Co provides an excellent example of a decision where the 
Tribunal has fully grappled with the theoretical issues. In rejecting the defendant's 
contention that the dispute was in essence concerned with the ability of the Greek 
Government to tax, the Tribunal first made it clear that "[c]onsiderations of sovereignty 
are not to be dismissed lightly".227 However, it noted that a tribunal also has a duty to the 
parties to resolve the dispute.228 Recognising the conflict between the sovereign rights of 
                                                
220  The decision in Joint Venture v State W (Award) (2011) 36 Ybk Comm Arb 135 potentially goes 
against this. State W alleged the Joint Venture owed taxes, relying on a provision that the Joint 
Venture would be subject to the laws of State W in this regard. While the Tribunal dismissed this 
claim based on a limitations point, and did not explicitly address arbitrability, there are indications in 
the decision that the Tribunal considered it would have been able to resolve the substantive tax law 
issues had the limitation period not applied. These can be found at [188] where the Tribunal noted 
the Joint Venture had convincingly shown State W's tax calculations were wrong, and [189] where it 
was noted that State W made assumptions as to its own tax laws, and did not provide evidence to the 
Tribunal. However, given the limited consideration by the Tribunal, it is hard to draw wider 
conclusions based on this decision. 
221  At 80-81. 
222  At 10.  
223  French Contractor v Libyan Employer, above n 82, at 10; and Engineering Co, above n 215, at [5]. 
224  In the excerpts, at least. 
225  At 11.  
226  At 10-11. 
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states and the duties of a tribunal, the Tribunal stated that it would not undertake a 
balancing exercise between the sovereign and private interests at stake. Rather, landing 
in a similar position to that in French Contractor, it would "carefully refrain from 
infringing upon the prerogatives of [the state]".229  
 
Applying this to the facts, the Tribunal in Engineering Co went on to highlight the 
distinction between assessing the "validity of Greek law or … the validity of the acts of 
the Government of Greece" and matters of contractual interpretation (in this case as to 
what the parties intended regarding the allocation of taxes).230 Decisions as to the 
correctness of the passing of tax legislation or particular tax assessments fell outside the 
Tribunal's "ambit",231 whereas the Tribunal was ultimately able to decide the issues 
before it, which merely concerned contractual interpretation.232 In the Tribunal's view, 
deciding the issues of contractual interpretation "could [not] be deemed to be offensive 
to state sovereignty".233 The Tribunal therefore felt it was able to resolve disputes 
relating to taxation "insofar as [the] question [was] solely one of interpretation of the 
contracts entered into by the said parties".234 
 
While these decisions clearly indicate that it is inappropriate for arbitral tribunals to 
decide substantive tax matters, and that there is a distinction to be drawn, it is important 
to recognise that the reasoning in these cases may have been affected by the fact that the 
Tribunals derived jurisdiction from two private parties. In particular, in disputes between 
private parties there appears to be no point arbitrating substantive tax disputes, as any 
award will not bind the relevant authorities.235 Further, in Engineering Co there are 
indications that perhaps if one of the parties was a state, a tribunal could decide 
substantive tax law disputes, but these are inconclusive.236  
 
Last, in Duke v Peru, a case involving an investor-state contract providing for the 
stabilisation of existing tax laws, and ICSID arbitration,237 the Tribunal both made it 
                                                
229  At [9]. 
230  At [12]-[15]. 
231  At [10]. 
232  At [14]-[15]. 
233  At [15]. 
234  At [16]. 
235  AED Oil Limited v Puffin FPSO Limited, above n 205, per Judd J.  
236  See [34] where the Tribunal reject the submission that the Government of Greece should be added as 
a party to the proceedings, on the basis that "[t]he arbitral tribunal is not going to pass judgment on 
the validity of Greek law, or … over the validity of the actions of the Government of Greece". In 
saying this, the Tribunal also noted (at [11]) that it "perfectly [understood] that the Government of 
Greece would find it patently offensive to its sovereign rights if a private body, like the arbitral 
tribunal, should somehow pass judgment" on the exercise of those rights. 
237  At [2],[72] and [186]. 
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clear that it could not deal with tax disputes directly implicating sovereignty, and drew a 
distinction with disputes of a contractual nature. The case involved a claim by Duke that 
Peru had breached a tax stabilisation provision.238 In deciding this point the Tribunal 
began by affirming that it did not have the "power to review the correctness" of 
decisions "as a matter of Peruvian tax law".239 It went on to say:240 
 
[216] The Tribunal's jurisdiction, under this particular guarantee, is limited to 
determining whether the relevant decisions or interpretations of SUNAT and/or the 
Tax Court, be they right or wrong, are consistent with the tax regime stabilized for 
Claimant in the DEI Bermuda [contract]. The Tribunal's standard is therefore 
comparative in nature, rather than absolute.  
 
The distinction being drawn here was captured succinctly in the Decision on Jurisdiction 
where the Tribunal stated that "[t]he issue before the Tribunal [was] not a dispute about 
taxes but, rather, an investment dispute arising out of the imposition of taxes".241  
 
However, the broader applicability of these remarks may be limited. The Tribunal 
appears to have been more concerned with what the contract gave it jurisdiction to do, as 
opposed to arbitrability. In the light of this, it may not be possible to conclude that the 
Tribunal viewed "dispute[s] about taxes" as inarbitrable, despite the comments about the 
Tribunal's lack of power in that regard. In particular, the Tribunal stated that the reason 
it could not decide "matters concerning the interpretation of tax law" was "as a 
consequence of DEI Egenor's use of the tax amnesty system", suggesting that if 
Peruvian dispute resolution procedures had not been made use of then the Tribunal may 
have been able to look at substantive tax law matters.242 In saying this, the fact that these 
cases draw a consistent line regarding sovereignty should not be minimised or ignored. 
(c) Comparison with cases that arise in a vertical context 
(i) Investment treaty arbitration 
 
Despite being derived from a vertical relationship, and applying international law 
standards, awards considering tax matters under investment treaties provide a useful 
                                                
238  At [138]. 
239  At [215]. 
240  At [215]-[216].  
241  Duke Energy International Peru Investments No 1 Ltd v Republic of Peru (Decision on Jurisdiction) 
ICSID ARB/03/28, 1 February 2006, at [159]. See also Amco v Republic of Indonesia (Resubmitted 
Case: Decision on Jurisdiction) (1988) 27 ILM 1281 at [126]-[127]. See also Gaillard, above n 65. 
242  At [225]. It is important to mention that Duke v Peru was the subject of annulment proceedings, but 
that Peru's Application for Annulment was "dismissed in its entirety": Duke Energy International 
Peru Investments No 1, Limited v Republic of Peru (Annulment Proceeding) ICSID ARB/03/23, 1 
March 2011 at [269]. 
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comparator to the consideration of international commercial arbitration. This article will 
briefly consider three such awards: Occidental Exploration and Production Company v 
Ecuador,243 Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets v The Argentine Republic244 and Paushok 
v Mongolia.245  
 
Occidental involved a dispute concerning refunds of value added tax. Arbitral 
proceedings were commenced under the Ecuador-US Bilateral Investment Treaty. The 
Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction under the Treaty, and proceeded to decide on 
liability. This involved considering whether Ecuador had accorded fair and equitable 
treatment to Occidental, and whether Ecuador had treated Occidental in a manner "no 
less favourable than that accorded in like situations to investments or activities of its 
own nationals and companies".246 Both of these standards were found to be breached by 
the tax treatment Ecuador gave Occidental.247  
 
Paushok involved an allegation that Mongolia had breached its obligations under 
the Russia-Mongolia BIT by implementing a windfall profit tax on some commodities 
and a fee on foreign workers.248 After deciding that it had jurisdiction to consider these 
Treaty claims, the Tribunal applied the Fair and Equitable Treatment and Expropriation 
provisions. Essentially, the Tribunal considered whether the enactment and enforcement 
of the tax laws violated the applicable treaty standards. No breach was found. Thus, just 
as contractual standards are arbitrable in the horizontal context, a dispute based on the 
relevant treaty standards is arbitrable in the vertical context. 
 
Further, in Paushok, Mongolia raised counterclaims requesting the Tribunal order 
payment of the disputed taxes.249  In determining whether it had jurisdiction over the 
counterclaims the Tribunal observed that the tax claims:250 
 
[arose] out of Mongolian public law and exclusively [raised] issues of non-
compliance with Mongolian public law, including the tax laws of Mongolia. All 
                                                
243  Occidental, above n 86. 
244  Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets LP v The Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction) ICSID 
ARB/01/13, 14 January 2004. 
245  Paushok, above n 178. 
246  At 63. 
247  At 63. 
248  At [11] and [109]. 
249  At [678]. There were many difficulties with these claims, including the fact that Paushok was not 
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of the complicated inter-party relationships. For completeness, it is worth only noting that the 
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these issues squarely fall within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Mongolian courts, [and] are matters governed by Mongolian public law …  
 
The Decision on Jurisdiction in Enron made similar remarks, noting that it would only 
judge "whether the rights of investors had been violated", not "whether such policies are 
right or wrong".251   
 
Second, the Tribunal in Paushok noted that deciding the counterclaims would have 
had the:252  
  
likely effect of advancing the enforcement of Mongolian tax laws by non-
Mongolian courts in respect of non-Mongolian nationals beyond limitations on the 
extraterritorial application of Mongolian tax laws rooted in public international law.  
 
It is worth noting as a caveat, that the Tribunal did make special mention of the fact that 
its jurisdiction was founded on the Treaty, and not in contract.253 
(ii) Iran-US Claims Tribunal jurisprudence 
 
The Iran-United States Claim Tribunal was established under the Algiers Declarations 
"to resolve the crisis" in Iran-US relations stemming from the "November 1979 hostage 
crisis … and the subsequent freezing of Iranian assets by the United States".254 The 
Tribunal has jurisdiction to:255 
 
decide claims of United States nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals 
against the United States, which arise out of debts, contracts, expropriations or 
other measures affecting property rights …  
 
The decision in Computer Sciences Corp v Iran is indicative of the Tribunal's 
approach to tax disputes.256 This case involved contracts for computer services between 
an American company and entities controlled by the Government of Iran. Computer 
Sciences sought reimbursement for taxes paid in excess of certain amounts.257 It also 
                                                
251  At [29]-[30].  
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254  "About the Tribunal" Iran-United States Claim Tribunal <http://www.iusct.net/>; and Rahmatullah 
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sought a declaration releasing it "from liability for [specified] Iranian taxes".258 In 
deciding the claims concerning reimbursement for taxes paid, the Tribunal drew a clear 
distinction between contractual and non-contractual claims, with only the former being 
arbitrable. In particular, it was noted that where an obligation to pay tax arose "from the 
application of the tax laws of Iran" and not "out of the Contracts" the Tribunal did not 
have any jurisdiction over the matter.259  
 
A similar distinction is evident in other Iran-US Claims Tribunal decisions. For 
example in Aeronutronic Overseas Services v Iran the Tribunal allowed the claimant to 
rely on the contractual provision requiring "the Air Force to reimburse the Claimant in 
the event taxes are imposed and required to be paid by the Claimant".260 However, with 
respect to the claimant's request for a declaration releasing it from future liability, and 
the counterclaims Iran made for the payment of taxes, the Tribunal in Aeronutronic 
Overseas Services found it lacked jurisdiction as such requests were essentially requests 
"that the Tribunal apply the tax laws of Iran".261 This principle has been consistently 
reaffirmed in Iran-US Claims Tribunal jurisprudence.262  
 
                                                
258  At 275-276. 
259  At 287-288.  
260  Aeronutronic Overseas Services v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, The Air Force of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Award) (1986) 11 Iran-USCTR 223 at [55] and [71]. See also 
Development and Resources Corporation v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
others (Award) Iran-US Claims Tribunal 485-60-3, 25 June 1990 at [295]-[296] where the 
reimbursement of surtaxes was provided for by an agreement between the parties; Cosmos 
Engineering Inc v Ministry of Roads and Transportation (Award) (1986) 13 Iran-USCTR 179 at [28] 
where a claim for the reimbursement of income taxes was entertained as reimbursement provisions 
were incorporated into the contract, but dismissed for lack of proof; and Arthur Young and Company 
v The Islamic Republic of Iran and others (Award) Iran-US Claims Tribunal 338-484-1, 30 
November 1987 at [63] where the Tribunal examined a stabilisation provision in the contract 
between the parties as to changes in tax laws. 
261  At [72]. 
262  See for example Westinghouse Electric Corporation v The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (Final 
Award) (1997) 33 Iran-USCTR 60 at [434]; TCSB Inc v Iran (Award) (1984) 5 Iran-USCTR 160; 
Combustion Engineering Inc, Vetco Inc, Natco UK Ltd v The Islamic Republic of Iran and others 
(Partial Award) (1991) 26 Iran-USCTR 60 at [88]; Collins Systems International Inc v The Navy of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (Award) Iran-US Claims Tribunal 526-431-2, 20 January 1992 at [92]; 
Development and Resources Corporation, above n 260, at [299], [380]-[381]; Cosmos Engineering 
Inc, above n 260, at [11]; Aeronutronic Overseas Services, above n 260, at [79]-[80]; Arthur Young 
and Company, above n 260, at [60]; Howard Needles Tammen and Bergendoff v The Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and others (Award) (1986) 11 Iran-USCTR 302 at [61]; and TME 
International v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and others (Award) Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal 473-357-1, 12 March 1990 at [130]. 
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As in ITA, concerns were also raised in Computer Sciences regarding the 
implications of the foreign revenue rule. With respect to the claimant's request for a tax 
clearance certificate, the Tribunal noted that this was:263  
 
essentially a request to enforce the tax laws of a sovereign state, in that what it 
seeks is a binding declaration of the taxes owed by the Claimant [and that it] is a 
'universally accepted rule that public law cannot be extraterritorially enforced'. 
  
(iii) Analysis 
 
Thus, it is clear that the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and ITA jurisprudence follow a similar 
distinction to that being proposed. In particular, claims that amount to a direct exercise 
of sovereign authority do not fall within the tribunals' jurisdiction, whereas those claims 
that do not directly implicate sovereign authority, but involve the application of a 
contract or treaty based standard do. In saying this, it is important to bear in mind that 
these cases were considering whether these disputes fell within the tribunals' jurisdiction 
– not arbitrability. One must then ask what relevance this line of decisions has to the 
question of arbitrability.  
 
It is suggested, that at the very least, these decisions indicate that there is a 
distinction that can effectively be drawn in practice between substantive tax law issues, 
that derive from an application of the tax law of a country, and standards based disputes 
which merely indirectly recognise the effect of the tax law of a state, whether these 
standards are international law standards or contractual.   
 
Further, it could be argued that the jurisdictional question, in the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal at least, was closer to the question of arbitrability than other determinations of 
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is usually a question of what the two parties to the arbitration 
agreement have agreed to arbitrate, whereas arbitrability is a question of whether, having 
agreed to arbitrate a subject-matter, the arbitration can go ahead. While in one sense 
arbitrability touches on the question of jurisdiction, these are distinct enquiries. 
However, with the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the jurisdictional question was a 
determination of whether the dispute fit within the broad parameters set out in the 
Algiers Declarations. This is closer to arbitrability than an ordinary determination of 
jurisdiction, as in one sense the Tribunal was deciding more generally what was 
appropriately in the domain of the Tribunal and what was appropriately left to the 
domain of the national courts of Iran and the United States. For example, it seems 
perfectly feasible that the Tribunal could have decided that counterclaims relating to tax 
                                                
263  At 312-313. See also Arthur Young and Company, above n 260, at [78] which affirmed Computer 
Sciences on this point.  
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arose out of the contracts, if it had thought this was an appropriate subject-matter for 
arbitration, as the only reason there was taxable activity was by virtue of the contracts. 
This view was in fact raised in dissent in Tribunal decisions. For example in Howard 
Needles v Iran the dissent noted its objection to the majority finding a lack of 
jurisdiction over tax counterclaims. The dissent considered these claims related to 
performance of the contract, and arose out of the legal relationship between the 
parties.264 
 
Even if this analogy between arbitrability and Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
determinations relating to jurisdiction does not hold, similar policy considerations arise 
in formulating the distinctions articulated in these decisions, to those discussed with 
respect to arbitrability. In particular, both lines of cases considered sovereignty and the 
prohibition on the enforcement of foreign revenue laws. Additionally, it is suggested that 
from a practical standpoint the potential symmetry between ITA, Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal jurisprudence and international commercial arbitration with respect to tax 
disputes, despite arising in slightly different contexts, can be used to bolster the 
conclusion that the proposed distinction is the appropriate one. Last, as outlined, it is 
likely there will be a convergence between the question of jurisdiction and arbitrability 
in this area, which may enhance the relevance of these decisions. 
2 Move towards greater arbitrability 
 
Having considered specific cases, it remains to look at arbitrability in other areas of 
law.265 Distilling trends in determining arbitrability from these areas reveals two points 
which support the proposition that tax disputes should be arbitrable, insofar as they do 
not directly implicate sovereignty. First, while each country has different rules regarding 
arbitrability, there is a general consensus that the scope of arbitrability in international 
commercial arbitration has been expanding.266 Second, it appears that arbitrability is 
increasingly not about subject-matter per se, but more about what the tribunal is 
expected to do with that subject-matter.  
 
The fact that more and more disputes are becoming arbitrable can be observed by 
reference to competition law, securities law, insolvency, intellectual property, illegality 
and fraud, bribery and corruption, natural resources, employment law, trade sanctions, 
                                                
264  Howard Needles, above n 262, dissenting opinion. See further, the dissent in TME International, 
above n 262, at [56]. 
265  See generally Born, above n 5, at 831-832 and Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at [572].  
266  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2115]. See also Born, above n 5, at 775-776; Craig, Park, and Paulsson, 
above n 21, at [5.07]; and Julian DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kroll Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003) at [9-41]. 
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and consumer law.267 At a general level this supports a greater role for the arbitrability of 
tax disputes. However, what is particularly important in terms of distilling trends in 
determining arbitrability is that even in subject-matter areas where arbitrability is 
expanding, some disputes are still reserved for resolution by state courts. These appear 
to be those that question functions that are exclusively reserved for the state.  
 
For example, while competition law disputes are now arbitrable in the United States 
and European Union, amongst other countries,268 this does not give tribunals "unlimited 
powers".269 In many jurisdictions, tribunals cannot grant individual "authorisations" or 
"exemptions" for transactions that may implicate competition law.270 Disputes 
concerning natural resources present a similar distinction. While historically disputes 
relating to "concession agreements and natural resources" were inarbitrable on the basis 
they involved matters of sovereignty,271 such disputes are now arbitrable to the extent 
that they involve "the commercial decisions made by States in the exercise of that 
sovereignty" and do not implicate the sovereignty to exploit or not exploit natural 
resources itself.272 Lew, Mistelis and Kroll support this distinction on the basis that:273 
 
On the one hand the tribunal does not have to determine the validity of the states 
exercise of sovereign power. On the other hand it gives the private party the 
required protection which it might not get in the courts of the host state. 
 
Further examples arise in the areas of insolvency law, intellectual property and 
bribery and corruption.274  While arbitrability has expanded in the area of insolvency by 
allowing "standard monetary claims against an insolvent party",275 "pure" bankruptcy 
issues, i.e. those "matters relating to the adjudication of the insolvency itself or the 
verification of creditors' claims"276, remain inarbitrable.277 Similarly, disputes questioning 
                                                
267  See generally Born, above n 5, at 831-832 and Gaillard and Savage, above n 8, at [572].  
268  For instance, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. See Born, above n 5, at 795. This departure has 
been motivated by the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi v Soler. See Lew, 
Mistelis and Kroll, above n 266, at [9-47]; and Born, above n 5, at 792-794. See also Mitsubishi, 
above n 193. 
269  Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [351]. 
270  Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [351]. 
271  Born, above n 5, at 831.  
272  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.142]-[2.143]; and Company Z and others (Republic of Xanadu) v State 
Organisation ABC (Republic of Utopia) (Award) (1983) VII Ybk Comm Arb 94 at 112-114.  
273  Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 266, at [9-91]. 
274  On bribery and corruption see generally Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 266, at [9-78]-[9-80] and 
[9-86]; Born, above n 5, at 803-805.  
275  Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 266, at [9-56]. 
276  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.128]; and Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 266, at [9-55]. 
277  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.128]; and Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, above n 266, at [9-55]; and Born, 
above n 5, at 809. 
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the validity or existence of intellectual property rights will be inarbitrable, as these are 
"plainly a matter for the public authorities of the State concerned … being monopoly 
rights that only the State can grant".278 In contrast, contractual disputes, between a 
licensor and licensee for example, are now arbitrable.279  
 
In the light of this it appears that arbitrability is increasingly not about subject-
matter per se, but more about what the arbitral tribunal is expected to do with that 
subject-matter. All of the matters which remain inarbitrable involve positive actions of 
the state regarding the granting of rights or the imposition or enforcement of non-
contractual obligations. A further common characteristic is that they all have the 
potential to impact either third parties, or society as a whole. This can be contrasted to 
the expansion of arbitrability in situations where the dispute is solely contractual.  
VI  Conclusion  
 
Thus, the fact that a dispute involves the subject-matter of taxation is not a bar to 
arbitrability. Rather, arbitrability is concerned with what the arbitral tribunal have been 
asked to do regarding the subject-matter of taxation. In accordance with the move away 
from subject-matter arbitrability, and the general trend in favour of arbitrability, if what 
the tribunal is asked to do is determine a contractual dispute that does not involve a 
determination of the validity of a state's sovereign actions, this should be arbitrable. On 
the other hand, if the tribunal is asked to determine a substantive tax dispute, implicating 
the sovereign interests of the state involved, this should not be arbitrable. As a general 
proposition it is likely that the only remaining strong-hold of the non-arbitrability 
doctrine will be those matters that directly impinge on or involve the sovereignty of the 
state, or system of states. This accords clearly with the general distinction put forward in 
this article.  
 
In addition, the examination of the arbitrability of tax disputes has highlighted the 
fact that the role of the doctrine of non-arbitrability is becoming more and more limited. 
As arbitrability expands, the potential for it to fully align with jurisdiction becomes 
greater. This is true either legally, or practically, depending on the circumstances. The 
fact that arbitrability and jurisdiction appear to be converging aligns with a broader 
policy approach of holding parties accountable for the decisions they make, that can be 
seen with respect to states in the shift from a broad doctrine of state immunity, to a 
narrow view that involves distinguishing between acts jure gestionis and acts jure 
imperii, and the decrease in the scope of the non-arbitrability doctrine more generally. 
                                                
278  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.118]. 
279  Blackaby, above n 2, at [2.118]. But see Poudret and Besson, above n 19, at [355] regarding the 
Swiss law on the arbitrability of intellectual property issues.  
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Despite this general observation, it is still important to consider the question of 
arbitrability, due to the fact it fulfils a fundamentally different function to questions of 
jurisdiction, in that it is not concerned with the consent of the parties. The distinction 
proposed, between those disputes which directly implicate issues of sovereignty and 
those that are merely contractual in nature, provides a principled resolution to the issue 
of arbitrability of tax disputes. It successfully reconciles considerations of sovereignty 
with the rights of states to enter into commercial arrangements. Further, it is a distinction 
capable of being supported with reference to a wide range of factors, including the 
nature of tax law, considerations relating to transparency, and the case law. Of course, in 
practice drawing the line between the two possibilities could be rather complex. 
Contractual consequences can have significant policy implications. However, if we 
accept that states are capable of engaging in commercial activity, this is a line that we 
must attempt to draw.  
 
Further, given the distinction drawn by this article is one that is generally applied 
and not often derogated from, it could be viewed as a rule of transnational public policy, 
whether specific to taxation or of a more general application based on state sovereignty. 
This enquiry into principles of transnational public policy is related to the question of 
whether it can be said that there is a general principle of law in this area.280 Indeed, based 
on the evidence presented in this article a general principle of law appears to exist.281 
However, further study is required to make decisive claims in that regard. What can be 
concluded is that transnational public policy could be used to decide arbitrability, 
mitigating choice of law issues. This approach is less focused on the consent of parties, 
and on finding the jurisdiction with the most involvement in a dispute - issues which 
inhibit the use or choice of the lex arbitri and the law governing the arbitration 
agreement. The potential use of transnational public policy also says something more 
generally about the expansive way in which arbitrability is developing, and the way in 
which it might develop in the future.   
                                                
280  Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945), art 38(1)(c).  
281  See Bin Cheng "General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals" 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953) at 1, where Cheng notes that general principles of 
law are "based on an examination of the decisions of international courts and tribunals" and that 
such decisions "constitute the most important means for the determination of rules and principles of 
international law". See also Christopher A Ford "Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: 
Article 38(1)(c) and 'General Principles of Law'" (1994) 5 Duke J Comp & Intl L 35 and HC 
Gutteridge "The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (1952) 38 Transactions of the Grotius Society 125.  
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It remains then, to make some brief comments on how the proposed distinction 
would fit procedurally within arbitration proceedings. The main issue concerns whether 
an arbitral tribunal can, and should, stay its proceedings whilst waiting for the resolution 
of court decisions on the substantive tax issues. This issue is different to the traditional 
issues that necessitate a consideration of the arbitral tribunal staying its proceedings, in 
that it involves no question of whether the tribunal should "stay the exercise of its 
jurisdiction".282 Rather, this is a situation where the tribunal cannot decide the matter, 
due to the lack of arbitrability. Further, this is not a situation where the arbitral tribunal 
and court are being asked to decide the same issue. There are two separate issues: the 
court's determination of the substantive tax matters and the arbitral tribunal's 
determination of the contractual consequences.  
 
The International Law Association in its Final Report on Lis Pendens and 
Arbitration concluded that "an arbitral tribunal should have a discretion to stay its own 
proceedings in appropriate circumstances".283 It is suggested that an "appropriate 
circumstance" would include a situation where a substantive tax law issue underlying a 
contractual claim needs to be resolved. Indeed, the report went on to conclude that 
"tribunals should have confidence to exercise case management powers and be 
empowered to stay their own proceedings, even when the situation [does] not fulfil the 
traditional criteria of lis pendens" (as is the case here). It was noted that the "ultimate 
objective should be to achieve a fair result as between the parties, and in some 
circumstances this may mean waiting for the outcome of other proceedings".284  
 
Thus, where underlying substantive tax issues need to be decided before the 
tribunal can render an award, it is appropriate that proceedings are stayed until such time 
as this issue can be resolved.285 Of course, tribunals in exercising their case management 
powers will need to be vigilant with respect to practical issues. For example, there may 
be circumstances where the host-state delays the resolution of the substantive tax issues, 
in which it would be appropriate for the arbitral tribunal to determine the contractual 
issues regardless of on-going court proceedings. Further, given the expense and time 
involved in organising international commercial arbitrations, the need to stay 
                                                
282  McLachlan, above n 50, at 289.  
283  Filip De Ly and Audley Sheppard "International Law Association Final Report on Lis Pendens and 
Arbitration" (2009) 25 Arb Intl 3, at [5.7]. See also Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (Decision on Jurisdiction) (1995) 3 ICSID Rep 131. 
284  At [5.11] 
285  In many cases the issue of a stay of proceedings will only arise if an appeal as to tax liability is 
underway, the original determination of tax liability being what triggered the dispute, i.e. a tax 
assessment viewed by the investor as contrary to a stabilisation provision.  
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proceedings should be determined as early in the process as possible.286 This would 
assist in facilitating "the efficient and economical conduct of the proceedings".287  
 
Ultimately, there appears to be nothing procedurally that would prevent arbitral 
tribunals from applying the proposed distinction. Thus, in undertaking its review of the 
arbitrability of tax disputes in international commercial arbitration, this article has 
discerned a principled distinction that is not only supportable in principle, but will be 
workable in practice for tribunals and courts alike. It is hoped that this resolution, and 
the broader observations on arbitrability that have resulted from the discussion in this 
article, will assist in both the determination of future disputes, and the future 
development of the doctrine of arbitrability. 
 
  
                                                
286 Blackaby, above n 2, at [6-105]; and Edward M Morgan "Contract Theory and the Sources of 
Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question" (1987) 60 S Cal L Rev 1059 at 1081. 
287  Blackaby, above n 2, at [6-33].  
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